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Abstract 
As we navigate the world, we prepare to make voluntary decisions in relation to the 
opportunities afforded by the environment. An essential aspect of these decisions is that 
they are experienced with a sense of free will. In both philosophical and layperson accounts 
of free will, the “ability to choose otherwise” serves a central role and, further, there is 
evidence that individuals preferentially choose options that maximise the availability of 
choice. The underlying reason for this widespread emphasis on choice has been difficult to 
reconcile with traditional views of free will and decision-making.  
Embodied theories of decision-making propose that individuals are driven to be in 
states where a greater number of options are available because this maximises their 
perceived ability to influence the environment in future states. This view places critical 
emphasis on the period of time that precedes a decision, during which individuals proactively 
prepare for the upcoming decision. On this basis, a decision may be experienced as free if 
the individual believes himself to have multiple potential options available. Studies have 
shown the ability to predict free choices but little is known about the role potential options 
plays during the voluntary decision-making process.  
In my thesis, I investigated the proactive neural processes of voluntary decision- 
making in dynamic environments. In particular, I aimed to test the hypothesis that free 
decisions are associated with a proactive state in which multiple potential choices are 
considered. To do so, I carried out a set of three studies where I examined behavioural and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data of participants while they performed free 
decisions in virtual environments. 
In Chapter 2, I designed an fMRI study to investigate the neural patterns of activity 
preceding a free decision. I found that frontoparietal and salience networks were more active 
for free decisions than instructed decisions during an initial period of proactive choice 
selection. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), I showed that upcoming choices could 
be predicted from both the motor and visual cortices once participants were able to match 
their planned colour choice to its spatial location. Notably, the decoding accuracy for free 
decisions was lower than instructed decisions, indicating less reliable choice representation. 
This corresponded to eye fixation results showing greater visual attention to the alternative 
options in the case of free decisions, together indicating that choice consideration may be 
an ongoing process when individuals freely prepare decisions. 
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In Chapter 3, I tested whether the state of having alternative options was reflected in 
neural representations of upcoming choices and, further, if this translated to differences in 
the subjective experience of free choice. In this fMRI study, I found that the availability of an 
alternative option could be decoded from patterns of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Moreover, decoding accuracy in this region significantly correlated with individual 
reports of perceived freedom, suggesting that the experience of free choice may have a 
neural correlate in the awareness of having alternative options.   
Finally, in Chapter 4, I asked whether the desire for availability of options could be 
explained using an active inference framework to model free choice behaviour. In contrast 
to economic decision models that are based on maximising value, active inference takes 
into account both the value of options and the entropy, which corresponds to the number of 
possible outcomes. I found that participants’ choice behaviour was significantly driven by 
both value and entropy and that these factors also influenced perceived freedom. 
Importantly, an active inference model better described choice behaviour than utility 
maximisation alone. Lastly, decision trajectories indicated forward-planning by participants 
that was more variable when an alternative option was available, adding to the theory that 
free choices are flexibly encoded. 
In summary, I showed that voluntary decisions engaged proactive choice selection 
processes that recruited the frontoparietal and salience networks. I found evidence from 
neural decoding and eye fixation patterns to suggest that upcoming choices are more flexibly 
prepared when decisions are free. A following study revealed that the availability of an 
alternative choice strongly influenced perceived freedom of choice and that this had a neural 
correlate in patterns of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Finally, I found that free 
choice behaviour could be explained by an active inference model, whereby individuals seek 
to maximise not only the value of outcomes but also the number of options available, and 
that both factors contributed to the subjective experience of free will. This supports the 
hypothesis that proactive preparation of voluntary decisions is associated with the encoding 
of multiple future states and that, overall, the experience of free choice is associated with 
perceived availability of options. 
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Chapter 1. 
General Introduction 
 
We carry out our daily lives with a strong sense of being in control of our own actions, 
or having free will to do as we choose. Whether free will exists or not, this experience and 
desire for free will is universally reported (Baumeister, 2008; Sarkissian et al., 2010) and its 
belief has a significant positive impact on moral behaviour and life outcomes (Baumeister et 
al., 2009; Stillman et al., 2010; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). One factor that appears essential 
to making our own decisions, and the sense of free will, is the availability of choice. Both in 
philosophical notions of free will, which often highlight the ability to choose “otherwise” 
(Banja, 2015), and in layperson reports of free will (Monroe & Malle, 2010), the awareness 
of having options available plays a significant role. Recently, advances in neuroscience have 
permitted us the opportunity to investigate the source of volition in the brain. In particular, 
traditional studies on the neuroscience of free will have examined the time preceding 
decisions to investigate whether choices can be predicted from neural activity or if 
individuals are, in fact, free to choose otherwise (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 
2008). From an embodied perspective of decision-making, however, predictive activity 
during this proactive period may represent a dynamic state of choice consideration for free 
decisions, in which intentions are flexibly encoded over time (Fleming et al., 2009; Pezzulo 
& Ognibene, 2012). By examining neural and behavioural representations predictive of 
upcoming choices, we aim to uncover whether free choices are associated with a state of 
ongoing choice consideration (Baumeister, 2008; Brass et al., 2013; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, 
et al., 2004; Roskies, 2010). 
In this thesis, I take an ecological perspective on the nature of free decisions, framing 
behaviour within the context of the real-world environment, to investigate the neural 
dynamics of voluntary decision-making. Specifically, I focus on the role that choice 
consideration plays in proactive decision preparation for free decisions. I provide support for 
the notion that the subjective experience of free choice is associated with a state of having 
options available and, further, that individuals may be driven to be in this “free” state as a 
means of optimising future states. 
For this general introduction, I first outline our current understanding of the 
neuroscience of free will before considering an ecologically valid approach to free choice. In 
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specific, an ecological perspective frames voluntary decision-making as decisions 
experienced in the context of real-world complexity. Centred on reports of the subjective 
experience of free will from the perspective of laypersons and associated findings, this 
approach highlights the strong, yet unexplained, preference for choice that humans and 
other species display (Bown et al., 2003; Catania, 1975; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Ono, 2000; 
Suzuki, 1997, 1999). In taking an ecological approach, it becomes necessary to examine 
cognition from a view that takes into account the dynamic nature of behaviour in complex 
environments. I examine cognition within the predictive coding framework, which is 
considered the brain’s mechanism to best process information for adaptive function in a 
highly dynamic world (Bar, 2007; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). 
Finally, I examine the dynamics of proactive decision preparation and the evidence we have 
to date that suggests free choices may be associated with flexible consideration of multiple 
options.  
 
Early Neuroscience of Free Will 
Philosophical notions of free will, generally of the libertarian viewpoint, define free will 
by the possibility to “do otherwise”. For a decision to be truly free, it must be equally likely 
that any one of the available options could be chosen (Banja, 2015; Bode et al., 2014). On 
this basis, decisions driven by value or punishment are not traditionally considered truly 
volitional (Schultz, 2015). This has often led to an interpretation of free will that is highly 
overlapping with an individual acting in a random manner (Ebert & Wegner, 2011). From the 
neuroscientific view of free will, free decisions have commonly been defined as those that 
originate from a self-initiated choice between available options, in contrast to being 
externally instructed (Haggard, 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). Traditionally, these studies have 
approached free decisions in a manner aligned closely with philosophical notions of free will, 
which specify the absence of factors that pre-determine or constrain the agent’s possible 
courses of action. By employing paradigms that ask participants to choose between arbitrary 
or random options, the premise has been that aspects unique to free decision-making could 
be examined, in the absence of effects related to aspects such as reward processing. The 
elusive aspect of “will” has been reserved for the essence that remains once all else is 
removed. As was famously stated by Wittgenstein (1953) - “What is left over if I subtract the 
fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”  
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Predicting Free Choices 
The traditional view of free will places strong emphasis on the conscious “self” as the 
source of will. On this basis, early neuroscientific studies on free choice focused on probing 
at what time neural activity for a specific response emerged relative to the time of conscious 
awareness for the choice. As Shepard and Reuter (2012) remark, early researchers in the 
field reasoned that if conscious awareness was preceded by predictive activity in the brain, 
this could be considered as evidence against free will. The pioneer in this field was Benjamin 
Libet, who took electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings of brain activity associated with 
motor preparation, termed the readiness potential (RP) (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965), while 
participants prepared to freely make button presses (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983). He 
found that, while participants became aware of their intention to make a button press on 
average 200ms prior to the action, as indicated by reporting the time on a clock, there was 
preparatory brain activity present one second in advance of their conscious awareness 
(Libet et al., 1983). These studies were the first to suggest that neural activity for upcoming 
choices arises prior to the conscious intention to act (Figure 1A). 
Studies since have extended on these findings with the use of brain imaging and 
multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), a more recent technique that uses a machine learning 
classifier to discriminate patterns of brain activity between different conditions (Haynes & 
Figure 1 Methods to predict free choices. A) Studies by Libet (1983, 1985) revealed that a 
readiness potential, indicating motor preparation for an upcoming button press, could be detected 
far in advance (red arrow) of a participant’s report of their conscious intention to act (blue arrow). 
B) Subsequent studies have relied predominantly on the use of brain imaging with multi-voxel 
pattern analysis to predict upcoming choices. This method uses a machine learning classifier to 
discriminate patterns of voxel activity that are associated with each condition, for example between 
choosing left or right. In searchlight decoding, this classification process is carried out on the whole 
brain, revealing regions where the choice can be decoded, or predicted, from. 
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Rees, 2006; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Norman et al., 2006). In MVPA, a classifier is trained 
on data by applying a decision boundary to separate populations of voxel responses 
associated with different conditions, such as choosing left or right (Figure 1B). The classifier 
is then applied to a test set to decode the pattern of activity in each trial, or time-point, 
attaining a decoding accuracy that reflects how well the patterns could be discriminated. In 
this way, choices can be predicted when patterns associated with a certain condition arise 
in the brain. When applied to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), MVPA has an 
advantage in sensitivity over typical cluster-threshold approaches as it can identify fine-
grained patterns of activity, even in the absence of gross changes in regional activity levels. 
Using this technique and a Libet-style task, Soon et al. (2008) examined the patterns of 
neural activity that could predict a decision to press a button prior to conscious intention. 
Remarkably, they were able to predict from activity in the frontopolar cortex (FPC) up to 10s 
prior to a button press whether participants would choose a left or right button. From this, 
the authors concluded that activity reflecting unconscious planning is stored in higher control 
areas prior to conscious awareness. Similar findings of predictive activity in medial frontal 
cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex have subsequently been found for abstract free 
decisions, such as choosing between images or mathematical operations (Bode et al., 2013; 
Soon et al., 2013).  
Such findings have, controversially, led some to conclude that the seemingly 
deterministic nature of what we perceive to be free decisions indicates that we do not have 
free will (Coyne, 2012; Wegner, 2003). However, while the assumption has been that each 
decision was performed independently, with the build-up of predictive activity relating 
uniquely to the upcoming choice (Soon et al., 2014), mounting evidence shows that 
decisions in such contexts are highly dependent on recent sequence history (Akaishi et al., 
2014; Bode et al., 2014; Lages et al., 2013; Lages & Jaworska, 2012; Soon et al., 2008). 
This idea is supported by statistical analyses that showed an equivalent classification 
accuracy to that reported by Soon et al. (2008) could be achieved for the upcoming choice 
based on sequential choice history alone (Lages et al., 2013; Lages & Jaworska, 2012). 
Furthermore, free choice tasks commonly find activation of the FPC (Bode et al., 2011; Soon 
et al., 2008; Soon et al., 2013), a region commonly reported in studies in which the values 
of multiple options need to be tracked over time (Boorman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2006). 
This region is believed to serve a primary role in “cognitive branching”, effectively 
coordinating choices between the multiple available options held online (Koechlin & Hyafil, 
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2007). Thus, it is difficult to conclude whether the predictive activity reported truly reflects 
preparation for the upcoming choice or is an artefact of bias from previous selections.  
More importantly, it is argued that neural activity for simple choices, or urges, cannot 
be considered representative of true voluntary decisions (Batthyany, 2009; Roskies, 2010). 
Participants might depend strongly on reverse inference when asked to report the 
awareness of simple decisions because conscious intention was simply not required during 
the decision-making process. Many of our decisions are considered to occur unconsciously 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Haggard, 2008), and active deliberation is only thought 
necessary when there is some level of uncertainty, or factors that we need to allocate 
resources to consider (De Ridder et al., 2013; Howard, 1966). For instance, you probably 
find your way to work each morning without much thought but feel free in the decision you 
make on what holiday to take next. Findings in highly artificial, repetitive, experimental 
contexts may therefore reflect aspects unique to the experimental environment that do not 
necessarily translate to veridical voluntary decisions (Bode et al., 2014; Haggard, 2008; 
Nahmias, 2010; van Duijn & Bem, 2005). In order to examine the aspects of voluntary 
decision-making that relate to our decisions in everyday life, we should consider the truly 
voluntary, or “active”, decisions that require conscious deliberation (Batthyany, 2009).  
 
Free Will & Availability of Choice 
Philosophical views of free will have raised criticism that they do not provide rational 
explanations of human choice behaviour, nor align with the human experience of free will 
(Banja, 2015; Nahmias et al., 2005). A more recently proposed account of free will suggests 
that free will, or the experience of it, should be considered with an ecological understanding 
of humans as biological beings (Banja, 2015). Namely, it is theorised that belief in free will 
evolved to encourage adaptive behaviour within the highly complex context of everyday 
decisions (Banja, 2015; Baumeister et al., 2011). According to layperson accounts, free will 
is associated with factors that promote a sense of control, such as the ability to choose, 
exhibit self-control, or plan for future goals (Baumeister et al., 2011; Stillman et al., 2011). 
Perceived level of freedom is also highest with decisions that are positively experienced, 
through both ease of decision-making and attainment of a positive outcome (Lau et al., 
2015). The subjective experience of free will, therefore, appears to be related to more 
practical behavioural outcomes than philosophical theories tend to suggest. Rather than 
investigating free will based on a third-person definition of what is free, an alternative 
approach is to investigate what aspects of decision-making individuals associate with the 
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subjective experience of free will (Baumeister, 2008; Callard & Fitzgerald, 2014; Filevich et 
al., 2013; Nahmias et al., 2005; Stillman et al., 2011). Regardless of whether free will truly 
exists, this could provide insight into what factors underlie the belief in free will.  
Interestingly, one factor that is widely recognised in both philosophical and 
behavioural considerations of free choice is the availability of choice (Roskies, 2010). The 
importance of having alternative options is central to libertarian views of free will but is also 
commonly reported by laypersons, who associate free will with the existence of options to 
choose between (Banja, 2015; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Stillman et al., 2011). However, rather 
than referring to the equivalence of all choices, laypersons’ perceptions of free will tend to 
emphasise the “freedom” to act in a self-determined nature, according to one’s own 
intentions (Bandura, 2001; Nahmias et al., 2005; Shepard & Reuter, 2012). People also 
report being strongly negatively influenced in perceived freedom by any factors that 
constrain choice, be it a reduction in the number of choices (Filevich et al., 2013) or external 
influences to a decision (Stillman et al., 2011). The experience of free choice, therefore, 
appears to be linked more specifically to the possibility to choose in order to attain a 
preferred outcome (Feldman et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2015; Shepard & Reuter, 2012). This 
ecological perspective on free will places a critical emphasis on choice in enabling one to 
enact their will on the external environment. 
In line with the idea that choice is valued for the positive sense of control it fosters, 
some studies have shown that participants prefer cues providing choice, but only when the 
cues predict a rewarding outcome (Cockburn et al., 2014; Leotti & Delgado, 2014). This 
same choice bias is not evident when participants predict the choice will be non-rewarding 
or negative. In a similar vein, participants show a preference for making their own choices 
when they are aware that a number of distinct possible outcomes exist but are more likely 
to forgo the opportunity to choose when outcomes are inconsequential (Ayal & Zakay, 2009; 
Mistry & Liljeholm, 2016). Therefore, the ability to choose may depend, in part, on providing 
flexibility of control, such that one’s actions most strongly influence the outcome (Mistry & 
Liljeholm, 2016). However, there is also evidence that individuals display a strong 
preference for the opportunity to choose even when this grants no benefit in the eventual 
outcome (Bown et al., 2003; Fujiwara et al., 2013; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Suzuki, 1997). In 
fact, this preference for choice appears to be conserved across a number of species 
(Catania, 1975; Ono, 2000; Suzuki, 1999). These studies reveal that, when faced with one 
option that leads to a direct action to receive an outcome or a second option requiring a 
subsequent choice to attain the outcome, subjects will preferentially choose the option that 
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provides further choice. This effect is evident even when the outcomes attained do not differ. 
Furthermore, individuals are more likely to choose the same option when it is paired with 
alternatives than when the option is considered alone (Bown et al., 2003). These findings 
raise the possibility that the availability of options is in itself desirable and that the ability to 
choose may foster a subjective sense of free will. In other words, freedom of choice may be 
defined by the degree to which a decision is perceived to impact on future states (Mistry & 
Liljeholm, 2016). 
 
Choice Selection Networks 
Studies examining the neural basis of choice selection have typically contrasted free, 
or self-initiated decisions, in which individuals choose between multiple options, with 
instructed decisions that provide only one option. These studies have identified extensive 
regions of the frontal and parietal cortices involved in self-initiated actions (Figure 2, for 
excellent reviews see Haggard, 2008 and Brass et al., 2013). The most consistent findings 
are recruitment of regions in the medial wall of the prefrontal cortex, notably the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) (Cunnington et al., 
2002; Cunnington et al., 2005; Hoffstaedter et al., 2013; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, et al., 2004; 
Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2007; Walton et al., 2004). These areas 
are thought to play a role in determining which action to select and at what time to initiate 
motor commands (Brass et al., 2013). In general, recruitment of the medial frontal cortex for 
intentional action has led to a suggestion of a medial/lateral divide in free versus instructed 
decisions, whereby medial regions coordinate information about the self and lateral areas 
are more strongly tied to incoming sensory information (Passingham et al., 2010). 
Areas of the frontoparietal network, particularly the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), have also been consistently associated with free 
decision-making across a range of tasks. Activation of the ACC, as well as the RCZ, is found 
during effortful decision-making and has often been attributed to decision conflict (Botvinick, 
2007; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Thimm et al., 2012). Conflict is thought to be an inherent 
aspect of any decision that requires selecting between multiple options, and could be 
attributed to the conflict in weighing options to freely make a choice (Botvinick, 2007; Brass 
& Haggard, 2008; Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 2005; Turk et al., 2004; 
Walton et al., 2004). ACC activity is greater not only for free choices but also other conditions 
associated with greater uncertainty, such as random sequence generation (Fan, 2014). 
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Similarly, greater activation in the DLPFC is proposed to reflect the higher demand placed 
on the action selection process when a free choice is made (Bunge et al., 2002; Rowe et 
al., 2005). The common finding of recruitment of areas of the frontoparietal network, 
independent of modality, has led to its suggestion as a higher order control region for free 
choice selection (Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). Taken together, these studies 
highlight the role that choice selection serves in free decisions and also point to differences 
in the sources of information that may underlie internally-generated versus externally-guided 
decisions.  
Studies have further demonstrated that the opportunity to choose may also activate 
regions of the neural reward system. It has been shown that feedback to actions following 
one’s own choice activates reward circuitry to a greater extent than decisions that lack 
options, or have outcomes that are not contingent on the choice made (O’Doherty et al., 
2003; Tricomi et al., 2004). One model posits that this could result from differences in neural 
activation that result in a positive reward prediction error only for self-initiated decisions 
(Cockburn et al., 2014). Essentially, a reinforcement signal produced in the basal ganglia 
circuitry during self-initiated choice boosts the positive feedback that results, leading to 
better learning but also a more positive association with choosing in general. Reward 
networks have also been found to be activated in anticipation of freely making a choice but 
not in advance of an instructed choice with an equivalent outcome (Leotti & Delgado, 2011, 
2014). There is also some suggestion from a study on the neural correlates of free will that 
subjectively free decisions are dependent on the perceived number of options available 
(Filevich et al., 2013). When asked to freely choose the next number in a sequence, 
participants rated choices as freer when the pattern of previous numbers was diverse (e.g. 
“3 2 1 4”) than when a choice seemed limited by the sequence (“3 3 3 3”). This recruited 
Figure 2 A meta-analysis of action selection shows regions commonly more activated for freely 
selected than instructed actions, including the bilateral pre-supplementary motor area, middle 
frontal gyrus, premotor cortex, inferior parietal cortex and the right inferior frontal gyrus (from Rae 
et al., 2014) 
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different neural activity than that for objectively-defined free choices, although the precise 
cause of these differences was difficult to elucidate. Together with the aforementioned 
behavioural choice preference, these studies indicate that the state of having choice is 
positively experienced prior to any action undertaken and, further, corresponds to 
differences in the neural activity representing choice. 
 
Future-Oriented Choice 
In order to understand why the opportunity for choice may be valuable, we turn to the 
view of voluntary decisions as goal-oriented decisions, whereby they are constructed 
according to the distal goal states an individual aims to attain (Prinz, 1992). On this basis, 
the experience of will is intricately tied to awareness of the outcomes that actions can have 
on the surrounding environment (Haggard, 2008). Goal-oriented views of decisions 
originally stemmed from an economic perspective, which considers decisions to be driven 
by the relative value and cost of options (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nash Jr, 1950). 
However, a number of findings, including those showing choice bias, are not in accordance 
with predictions from models that rely on value alone (Bown et al., 2003; Schwartenbeck  et 
al., 2015; Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012). Namely, these studies demonstrate decisions that are 
made despite no obvious gain in the value of the outcome attained, or sometimes even to 
the detriment of potential value gained. Economic models tend to fail in more realistic 
scenarios because they depend on the assumption that an individual acts with full 
knowledge of the alternative options available, which is often not possible in the complexity 
of real-world environments (Koechlin, 2014; Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012; Wunderlich et al., 
2012). Rather, in ecological decision-making scenarios, individuals must take into account 
not only the value of possible options but factors that determine the ability to reach those 
outcomes in future. Thus, in order to understand why availability of options may be 
important, we focus on embodied models of decision-making that take into account the 
information available during decision planning.  
One compelling explanation for the preference shown for availability of choice is 
provided by computational models based on sensorimotor control (Friston, 2010; Klyubin et 
al., 2008). Klyubin et al. (2005; 2008) first proposed that, from an embodied perspective, 
individuals are driven to be in a state in which they maintain the greatest influence in future 
states or, in other words, maximise the number of potential actions that can be taken. This 
was originally measured in information-theoretic terms of empowerment, which is the 
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amount of potential control an agent perceives it can exert on the world through its actions. 
On this basis, an agent chooses in order to maximise the immediate outcome but, crucially, 
also takes into account the future states that may be reached as a result of the action. A 
greater number of options is always preferred as it increases the likelihood that the agent 
will be able to reach an optimal outcome in future. Essentially, accepting that the world is 
dynamic and always uncertain, “keeping your options open” maintains access to possible 
options so that an individual is in a position to most readily take advantage of any 
opportunities that arise (Klyubin et al., 2005; Klyubin et al., 2008).  
This factor is also accounted for in a computational model of cognition, termed the 
Free Energy Principle (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2015), which is built on predictive coding 
(von Helmholtz, 1925). This theory describes the way we experience the world as a process 
of active inference, whereby agents constantly generate models of the future states they 
expect to be in and use this to infer the origin of sensory information (Botvinick & Toussaint, 
2012; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). Active inference further elaborates that agents aim to 
minimise the uncertainty, or free energy, about future states through the actions taken in the 
world (Friston, 2010). These actions are driven by beliefs about the optimal future states, 
which are established through a process of Bayesian estimation. Essentially, an agent uses 
the knowledge learnt about various states from prior experiences to proactively prepare for 
future scenarios (Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2015). Similar to the theory on 
empowerment, this model predicts that an agent is driven to maximise not only the utility of 
options but also the epistemic value, or information, of future states (Friston et al., 2015). 
This is measured as Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948) and can be considered equivalent 
to the number of options available in a context. Of note, entropy in this form is not equivalent 
to exploration for the purpose of uncertainty minimisation, but rather the goal is to keep 
options open (Klyubin et al., 2008; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). 
Thus, active inference predicts that, in order to reduce uncertainty of future states, 
individuals will prefer contexts that provide a number of available options.  
Formulations of this theory to model decision behaviour are very recent (FitzGerald 
et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2016; Friston et al., 2017) but there is some evidence that it can 
more accurately predict participants’ choices than models based on expected utility alone 
(Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). Schwartenbeck  et al. (2015) asked participants to choose 
between sets of different numbers of items, from which participants would receive only one 
of the items chosen at the end of the task. While economic models predict that individuals 
will choose whichever set maximises the likelihood of attaining a specific valuable item, 
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active inference predicts a tendency to maximise the number of options available. The 
authors found that participants had a preference for larger choice sets, with model 
predictions indicating that the majority of participants aimed to maximise entropy, or the 
number of items in the set, as well as value. These results are in accordance with the choice 
bias reported in previous studies (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Suzuki, 1997) and suggest that 
preference for choice could potentially be explained with an active inference model. 
Moreover, this model may be able to provide an embodied explanation for the strong 
association that exists between free will and availability of options. 
Thus far, there is evidence that individuals associate the experience of free will with 
choice, or the availability of options. It has traditionally been assumed that the provision of 
choice is beneficial because it provides the opportunity to self-initiate a decision, and in 
doing so exercise control by acting on the environment. Theoretical evidence presented 
provides a complimentary perspective indicating that this preference for choice may 
correspond to an adaptive mechanism of proactively keeping options open during decision-
making in real-world contexts. Based on this ecological view, we would posit that preference 
for choice may be beneficial as a state of decision-making in which an individual essentially 
believes themselves to be free if their perceived possibilities for future actions encompass 
a number of alternative options available to them. This emphasis on potential choice 
persuades us to consider the proactive period of decision-making as a significant stage in 
free choice. 
 
Proactive Choice Preparation  
Based on our understanding of decisions as future-oriented, we expect that actions 
do not arise spontaneously, but should be preceded by activity encoding the internal and 
external information on which a decision is built (Nahmias, 2010). This period is the time to 
which we typically attribute the intention of a decision (Haggard, 2005). While action 
planning is well-researched, there have been few studies identifying neural correlates of 
abstract intentions (Roskies, 2010). Attentional networks appear to play a role in proactive 
decision preparation, as activity in the right middle frontal gyrus and dorsal ACC predicts 
free decisions to reorient attention (Gmeindl et al., 2016). Further, activity in the pre-SMA 
overlaps when attending to an action and attending to the intention to act, leading to the 
conclusion that activity maintaining intention is the same source that then generates a self-
initiated action (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, et al., 2004). When intentions are held for future 
states, information may be stored in different regions from those that underlie immediate 
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execution. For example, the medial prefrontal cortex has been found to hold intention during 
a delay until action (Haynes et al., 2007) and FPC is recruited when holding information 
across task sets (Gilbert, 2011), in line with its purported role in cognitive branching (Soon 
et al., 2013). There is, therefore, some indication that abstract representations of choice are 
encoded proactively for upcoming decisions. 
An interesting consideration is that the process of free choice selection may not occur 
as a discrete event, but could constitute a dynamic state over the course of decision 
preparation. This is suggested by embodied theories of decision-making that propose that 
cognition is a continuous, dynamic process that results from the ongoing interaction between 
an individual and their environment (Cisek & Pastor-Bernier, 2014; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 
2012; Spivey & Dale, 2004; Van Dijk et al., 2008). On this basis, decision preparation is not 
considered a serial process from thought to action but rather a dynamic state, in which the 
intention at any one point reflects the current state of information for the upcoming decision 
(Cisek & Pastor-Bernier, 2014; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Spivey & Dale, 2004; van Duijn 
& Bem, 2005; Wang, 2008). The implication of this view is that an individual may at any one 
point in time encode multiple available options that they consider as possibilities for courses 
of action, effectively forecasting multiple future paths (Figure 3).  
In support of this theory, it has been proposed that free decisions may function on a 
mechanism of evidence accumulation, whereby activity becomes increasingly 
representative of the upcoming decision as the time of action approaches (Bode et al., 2011; 
Bode et al., 2014). Findings from both RP and MVPA studies demonstrate a ramp up in 
predictive activity leading to a free decision, indicating that the neural representation of an 
upcoming choice becomes gradually more predominant over time (Bode et al., 2011; 
Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). Evidence in this case may not relate to sensory 
information, as in perceptual models of evidence accumulation, but could reflect sampling 
from internal sources of information, for example in determining the value of the available 
options (Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Stewart et al., 2006). A voluntary action may then 
proceed once a certain threshold in firing is achieved, with the same activity potentially giving 
rise to the feeling of intention (Fried et al., 2011; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Haggard, 2005).  
In the absence of sufficient evidence for an action, or alternatively, evidence in favour 
of not completing an action, action execution may be vetoed. Libet (1983) was the first to 
show that participants sometimes exhibited neural activity that indicated an action was being 
prepared but then did not go on to perform it. This perceived ability to veto prepared actions 
was later termed the ‘late whether’ component (Brass & Haggard, 2008). It seems that 
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signals in the medial wall of the prefrontal cortex mediate the ‘no-go’ signal, just as they 
drive a ‘go’ decision, perhaps in response to higher-order inputs from the frontal and parietal 
cortices (Haggard, 2008; Karch et al., 2009). A noteworthy study using real-time prediction, 
in which the participants competed to press a button before a machine detected their choice, 
provided further support that decisions can be withheld up to a certain point (Schultze-Kraft 
et al., 2016). On this basis, conscious intention may only arise some 200ms prior to a button 
press because that is the point at which evidence is sufficient to commit to a particular 
decision (Schurger et al., 2012). This coincides with the onset of a subsequent lateralised 
RP, indicative of motor activity contralateral to the hand being used and, therefore, 
commitment to a particular action (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Schurger et al., 2012). Until this 
threshold is reached, an upcoming decision may exist in a malleable state in which evidence 
integration for available outcomes is ongoing. 
 
Parallel Choice Options 
A critical consideration is that predictive activity for decisions represents the global 
emergent evidence towards a specific choice, but the underlying signals can consist of 
multiple sources contributing evidence towards different outcomes. This is exemplified in a 
study by Fried et al. (2011), using single-cell neuronal recordings of human participants to 
examine changes in firing patterns of different neuronal populations. The authors reported 
that activity in the medial frontal cortex was the earliest predictor of an upcoming action, 
building over time with a decoding accuracy of 70% up to one second prior to conscious 
intention (Fried et al., 2011). However, different populations of neurons displayed different 
activity patterns, with some decreasing in firing rate in the lead up to a decision. One 
possibility is that the combined output of these neuronal patterns is necessary to generate 
a specific action. An alternative theory is that these neuronal units encode different actions 
and the changes in firing indicate competition between the possible outcomes (Haggard, 
2011). 
This idea has been formalised in the affordance competition hypothesis, which states 
that multiple potential actions are encoded simultaneously and continuously updated as 
agents proactively navigate the world (Cisek, 2007). Neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex 
appear to encode the various action possibilities and to be activated on the basis of their 
relative value (Bastian et al., 2003; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). Incoming connections from 
prefrontal regions for task-relevant information, basal ganglia and striatum to the pre-SMA 
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for reward information, and the parietal cortex for updated sensorimotor information are then 
thought to modulate the evidence towards each of the alternatives (Cisek, 2006, 2007). 
Initially, neurons encoding parallel action plans are simultaneously active as each plan 
competes for execution. Over time, evidence towards one alternative may favourably 
increase, leading to a progressive bias until a threshold is reached. At this point, the winning 
plan feeds through to action execution while activity for the alternative plan drops (Cisek, 
2007; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). It is possible that once an intention is generated, 
processes to reinforce it and prevent competing alternatives also occur (Haggard, 2005). Of 
note, this same parallel processing does not occur when only one choice is possible (Figure 
3 lower left panel). 
Indicators of Choice Consideration 
Applying this concept to free choice, an intriguing question is what the predictive 
activity can reveal about the dynamics of choice selection. We would expect that a notable 
characteristic of free choices is that they are more flexibly encoded than instructed 
Figure 3 An embodied view of free choice. Right panel) As an individual navigates the world, they 
hold in mind the various options they have available to them, for example to take a left or right fork 
in the path. This awareness of having alternative options may foster a sense of free will. Left panel) 
Neural activity is less strongly encoded in the time leading to a free decision than an instructed 
decision, raising the possibility that it is more flexibly encoded (upper; adapted from Fleming et al., 
2009). According to the affordance competition hypothesis, neural representations of all potential 
actions are encoded in parallel. When only one choice is given, a decision is immediately committed 
to, whereas when multiple options are possible evidence builds towards each of the options 
according to ongoing information acquired (lower; from Cisek et al., 2007).  
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decisions, which is supported by a few studies to date. In an EEG experiment investigating 
free or instructed decisions, it was shown that free choices were more adaptable to 
environmental cues (Fleming et al., 2009). The contingent negative variation (CNV), a 
marker of motor preparation, developed at a later onset for free choices and in the event the 
participant had to change their decision the resulting P300 was smaller, indicative of less 
top-down cognitive control necessary to modify the initial choice (Figure 3 upper left panel). 
One explanation put forward is that the signals from parietal regions that build decision 
evidence are weaker in the case of free decisions because there is no clear stimulus-driven 
motivation for a particular choice (Fleming et al., 2009). As a result, alternative actions may 
remain encoded for longer, leading to less discrimination between choice outcomes. This 
finding of weaker discrimination between choices in free decisions than instructed decisions 
has also been reported in a later MVPA study (Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). Further 
suggestion that options continue to be considered throughout decision preparation comes 
from Filevich and Haggard (2013), who found that even if options were removed from a 
decision set, response times scaled according to the load of the initial set. Hence, it appears 
that an internal representation of all options initially available may be maintained until the 
time of decision execution.  
A key consideration is that, if information preparation occurs in parallel with action 
preparation, the effects of choice deliberation should be evident in the physical interactions 
of an individual with the environment during decision preparation (Cisek, 2007; Pezzulo & 
Ognibene, 2012; Spivey & Dale, 2006). With recent approaches that create more temporally 
continuous experimental contexts, studies have shown that information that is currently 
being processed during decision-making has an effect on the dynamics of the decision 
execution. Consideration of the available alternatives is evident in both eye and limb 
movements during the decision process (Barca & Pezzulo, 2015; Krajbich et al., 2010; 
McKinstry et al., 2008; Spivey & Dale, 2004, 2006). A number of studies have shown that 
motion trajectories when reaching for decision targets reflect the certainty in information 
guiding decisions. When confident, people will move their hand directly towards the location 
of the matching answer, but uncertainty from competing alternatives will cause the trajectory 
to be attracted to the other options (McKinstry et al., 2008; Song & Nakayama, 2009; Spivey 
& Dale, 2006). This adds to previous known effects on response time by showing that, even 
once an action is initiated, parallel processes of information preparation continue until closer 
to decision execution (Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). 
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Abstract decision intentions do not only influence motor preparation but it has been 
suggested that ongoing attentional focus contributes to the evidence that generates a 
decision. Attentional mechanisms serve to increase processing of the most essential pieces 
of information in the context and this information that is collected in turn influences the 
decisions that are made (Krajbich et al., 2010; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). Visual fixations 
to stimuli have been found to build evidence in favour of the fixation target, which suggests 
that visual attention is far more active in guiding the decision preparation than previously 
considered (Krajbich et al., 2010). Notably, under active inference, visual saccades are 
considered a mechanism to actively test the hypotheses about the current state in the 
environment, in which case sensory evidence is assimilated into the belief estimates that 
drive decisions (Friston et al., 2012; Mirza et al., 2016). This may explain findings of visually-
primed cues influencing subsequent freely-generated responses (Mattler & Palmer, 2012; 
Wenke et al., 2010). Together, these findings suggest that free decisions are in a malleable 
state in which ongoing internal and sensory evidence can change the course of the decision 
that is ultimately made.  
In conclusion, the availability of choice is a central theme in philosophical and 
layperson considerations of free will. Having options available is important in providing the 
opportunity to choose but, in the context of the real world, decisions are dynamic and options 
need to be considered over time. The choice preference that individuals display has been 
proposed to provide an adaptive advantage in terms of optimising access to future states. 
This leads to the possibility that the ongoing consideration of alternative options is a 
mechanism that underlies the sense of volition in decision-making. If people associate free 
choice with the state of having options, this may be reflected in the level of free choice they 
experience when interacting with choice options in an environment. Further this could 
potentially result in a difference in the neural and behavioural dynamics of decision-making 
in the time preceding a decision. 
 
Thesis Rationale 
It can be argued that, given the complexity of external and internal sources that 
appear to contribute to free decisions, these decisions should be viewed no different to other 
decisions driven by an individual’s own motivations (Bode et al., 2014). What is, however, 
unique to a free decision is the individual approach to decisions and the associated 
subjective experience. To date, there is little research on the subjective experience of free 
choice, particularly in relating what aspect of choice selection fosters the perception of 
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volition (Brass et al., 2013). This is owing in part to limitations of traditional experiments, 
whose highly controlled and static nature make true volition difficult to attain (Brass et al., 
2013; Haggard, 2008). By adopting the use of more ecological paradigms that allow for 
spatiotemporal continuity in behaviour, it is hoped we will have better insight into the 
dynamic nature of the decision-making process (Zgonnikov et al., 2017). There also exists 
a paucity of research on the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of free decisions 
in general (Bode et al., 2014). Investigating the perceived freedom of choice provides the 
opportunity to identify where free choices, and their associated subjective experience, arise 
in the brain (Filevich et al., 2013). 
In this thesis, I set out to investigate the neural processes underlying voluntary 
decision-making in ecological contexts. I focus specifically on the proactive decision period 
to identify processes of choice selection and intention for free decisions. I take an ecological 
approach to both the concept of free choice and task design, by which I endeavour to 
approximate more veridical experiences of free decisions. Taking an embodied view of 
cognition requires that decisions are studied within contexts that afford a degree of 
interaction with external cues. To address this, I have developed novel experimental tasks 
in computer-based virtual environments. On the premise that voluntary decisions are goal-
based in nature, a continuous environment also provides an active time window for 
participants to engage with the environment, and in doing so more naturally prepare their 
choices. In addition to the virtual environment, I make use of techniques designed to capture 
the dynamics of decisions, including eye-tracking in the first study, and additionally motion-
tracking in my final study. Finally, throughout my studies, I aim to account for the individual 
nature of free decisions by allowing a high degree of freedom in task completion and also 
by collecting subjective reports on decision strategies and perceived freedom.  
In Study 1 (Chapter 2), I first test for evidence of proactive decision preparation in the 
context of a more complex decision-making task in a virtual environment. Specifically, I 
hypothesise that free decisions are associated with greater proactive consideration of 
options and this will be evident in both the neural patterns of activity for free choice selection 
and the visual attention to the options. I use a multi-modal approach to this fMRI study, 
applying partial least squares (PLS) analysis to investigate whole-brain networks 
dissociating free and instructed decisions and MVPA to examine the patterns of 
representations predicting upcoming decisions. Eye-tracking adds to these results by 
providing a behavioural marker of choice deliberation. This study provides a foundation 
understanding of proactive choice representation for free decisions. In Study 2 (Chapter 3), 
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I aim to specifically examine whether the availability of an alternative option is associated 
with greater perceived freedom, and if differences in perceived freedom are reflected in 
neural representations. My approach for this study combines MVPA of fMRI data with 
subjective reports of perceived freedom for each participant. In my final study (Chapter 4), I 
investigate the preference for availability of options by allowing participants to freely choose 
between rooms in a more complex virtual environment. Rather than directly probing free 
choice, I hypothesise that if individuals associate free choice with having options, they will 
show a preference for contexts that provide greater availability of options. I frame this within 
an active inference approach and use both computational modelling and motion-tracking to 
investigate individual choice behaviour. To conclude, in Chapter 5 I discuss the findings of 
this thesis in the context of the field of voluntary decision-making, specifically elaborating on 
the contribution of this thesis to an embodied and ecological view of free choice.    
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Preface 
 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the current knowledge on predictive activity for free decisions and 
outlined the limitations in methodology and interpretation of these findings. Specifically, the 
tasks used to investigate free decisions have typically required participants to make highly 
simplistic decisions in artificial scenarios, such as pressing a button upon an urge. In 
addition, the repetitive nature of these tasks has made it difficult to conclude to what extent 
predictive activity reflected the upcoming choice, rather than sequence history. Embodied 
theories posit that decisions are intricately linked to the environment, in which case 
embedding decision tasks within a dynamic context may better approximate veridical 
decision process. To address these points, in this functional magnetic resonance imaging 
study, I design a more ecologically-valid task in a virtual environment to investigate 
predictive processes for free decisions. The aim of this chapter is to establish if more 
complex free decisions can be predicted from neural activity during phases of abstract 
choice and motor planning. Moreover, I aim to investigate if free decisions are associated 
with markers of proactive choice selection. 
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Chapter 2.  
Proactive preparation of voluntary decisions recruits 
frontoparietal and salience networks 
Rens, N., Bode, S., Burianová, H., Cunnington, R. 
Submitted to Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 
 
Abstract 
There is evidence that neural patterns are predictive of free decisions, but findings 
come from paradigms that have typically required participants to make arbitrary choices 
decisions in highly abstract experimental tasks. It remains to be seen whether proactive 
neural activity reflects upcoming choices for individuals performing decisions in more 
complex, dynamic, scenarios. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we 
investigated preparatory neural activity for free decisions compared with instructed 
decisions in a virtual environment, which more closely mimicked a real-world decision. Using 
partial least squares analysis, we found that the frontoparietal and salience networks were 
associated with free choice selection from a time at which decisions were abstract and 
preceded external stimuli. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis, we showed that participants’ 
choices, which were decodable from motor and visual cortices, could be predicted with lower 
accuracy for free decisions than for instructed decisions. This corresponded to eye-tracking 
data showing that participants made a greater number of fixations to alternative options in 
free choice trials, which might have resulted in less stable choice representations. These 
findings suggest that free decisions engage proactive choice selection, and that upcoming 
choices are encoded in neural representations even while individuals continue to consider 
their options in the environment. 
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Introduction 
Voluntary decisions are defined by the ability to select an option from amongst a 
number of available alternatives (Haggard, 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). Typically, free 
decisions have been contrasted with instructed decisions at the time the decision is made, 
emphasising differences in self-initiating a free response (Cunnington et al., 2002; 
Dominguez et al., 2011; Forstmann et al., 2006; Krieghoff et al., 2011; Rowe et al., 2005; 
Taylor et al., 2008; Thimm et al., 2012). However, decision-making is increasingly viewed 
as a proactive process in which neural activity prior to the decision corresponds to 
preparation of the upcoming choice (Friston, 2010; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). Previous 
studies have shown the ability to predict freely made choices in highly simplified contexts 
(Bode et al., 2013; Bode et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2008; Soon et al., 2013), but it is unknown 
what processes underlie free decisions in more complex, ecologically-valid environments, 
which require an ongoing, proactive commitment to an initially formed intention. 
Studies investigating brain responses in the pre-decision period have found patterns 
of neural activity representing the upcoming choice, particularly when the choice is freely 
prepared (Bode et al., 2011; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008; Soon et 
al., 2013). When participants were presented with random monetary gains, Leotti and 
Delgado (2011) found that reward circuitry was recruited in anticipation of a free colour 
choice but not preceding a forced choice. Predictive encoding of free decisions has also 
been evident in areas of the sensory cortex (Kostelecki et al., 2012), frontopolar cortex, and 
medial prefrontal cortex (Soon et al., 2008) when individuals chose randomly between left 
or right button presses (Kostelecki et al., 2012; Soon et al., 2008), or decided whether to 
add or subtract two numbers (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2013). Furthermore, it was 
found that frontopolar cortex activity represented the content of simple decisions only if 
participants had the intention to voluntarily decide between two arbitrary options, but not if 
they believed themselves to be guessing (Bode et al., 2013). These studies suggest that 
voluntary decisions involve more proactive processes than instructed decisions, potentially 
recruiting different neural networks, depending on the nature of the decision. 
Another noteworthy feature of previous studies that impacts their generalisability is 
that these studies have predominantly relied on participants making arbitrary choices, which 
were substantially removed from real-world situations. One side effect of this type of 
experimental design is that participants might have started producing relatively predictable 
sequences (Lages et al., 2013; Lages & Jaworska, 2012; Soon et al., 2014). In addition, 
some authors have argued that choices in some of these experiments barely qualify as true 
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free decisions because they are irrelevant (Batthyany, 2009). In line with this reasoning, it 
has been argued that voluntary decisions should allow the freedom to choose between 
options “because of a desire, goal or preference” (Schall, 2001). This means there is a need 
for more ecological contexts in which measures can provide detail about the dynamic 
evolution of decision states (Kingstone et al., 2008; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Smilek et 
al., 2006; Song & Nakayama, 2009). In such scenarios, decisions can be conceptualised as 
more dynamic processes, rather than as single events in time. Hence, voluntary decisions 
might also be prone to change, because other choice options continue to be available.  
Evidence of greater engagement of the frontoparietal network for free decisions, 
irrespective of modality, has led some authors to propose this to be a higher order free 
decision network (Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). Regions of this network have been 
commonly found to be more involved when people make free decisions than instructed 
decisions (Coricelli et al., 2005; Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; 
Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). However, these studies have only reported activity 
at the time of response, when action selection is underway and there are demands on visual 
attention, which is also known to recruit the frontoparietal network (Scolari et al., 2015). In 
the context of a dynamic decision environment, it may be that regions for choice selection 
are proactively recruited during the entire decision period, leading up to the execution of the 
chosen option, while participants still engage with available choice options.  
In order to investigate the proactive preparation of free decisions, we created a novel 
decision-making paradigm in a virtual environment that was performed during functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). At the beginning of each trial, participants were asked 
to choose between three different coloured doors at the end of a corridor to find stars 
(functioning as reward cues), which were randomly hidden behind them. In the Instructed 
condition, participants were told the colour of the door to choose, while in the Free condition 
participants could freely choose between the coloured doors. Participants then “walked” 
along the virtual corridor and selected their chosen door when they reached the end. We 
analysed the period of time leading up to decision execution, conceptualising the entire 
period as a dynamic decision with phases of choice selection and motor preparation.  
Crucially, the doors were not visible when making the initial choice, as the location of 
each coloured door only became visible at the halfway point in the corridor. Therefore, there 
could be no spatial attention or motor preparation differences between the different option 
doors during this initial phase of the trial. We predicted that activation of the frontoparietal 
network during the initial period would support its purported role in free choice selection. We 
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also investigated whether we could decode the specific representation of the colour door of 
choice. The second phase of the trial revealed the position of the coloured doors and allowed 
participants to visually attend to their choices and begin specific motor preparation. This 
allowed us to decode the motor choice and, in addition, to investigate visual attention to the 
choices using eye-tracking. With this approach, we aimed to identify and explain differences 
in the representations of choice plans during proactive preparation of free and instructed 
decisions.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-seven participants were recruited after providing written informed consent. 
All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision and no history 
of psychiatric or neurological trauma or disorder. Five participants were excluded due to 
excessive head movement. Data from the remaining 22 participants were used in the 
analyses (15 female, mean age 23 years, range 20-29 years). Participants were 
compensated monetarily for their time. The University of Queensland Medical Research 
Ethics Committee approved the experiment. 
 
Experimental task 
Participants underwent a brief training session with instructions outside the scanner 
prior to completing the experimental task in the 3T MRI scanner. The task was based in a 
simple virtual environment, presented through Psychtoolbox on MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc., 
Natick, MA, USA). The paradigm is shown in Figure 1. The virtual environment was used to 
create a dynamic task where participants were actively engaged in the epoch leading up to 
their decision execution. Participants viewed rendered images of the three-dimensional 
corridor with a first-person perspective from their current position, which was continuously 
updated in response to their movement. The task was to decide between three colours of 
doors, then to navigate a corridor until the doors were reached, and finally to select the door 
with the chosen colour. 
Each trial began with an instruction screen indicating one of two conditions. In the 
Instructed condition, participants were told which door colour – red, green or blue – to 
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choose. Correctly choosing the instructed door always resulted in a star. The Free condition 
asked participants to choose a colour door of their own volition. They were explicitly informed 
that the outcome for Free trials was random, which allowed us to create incentive to make 
the choices while maintaining a scenario in which each choice was equally likely. Critically, 
the doors were not visible at the time participants were instructed to make their choices, so 
the choices were made for colour and not for a particular spatial location. The only restriction 
to the decision was that participants were not permitted to make the same colour choice as 
in the previous trial. This had the advantage that it limited choice patterns, such as choice 
repetitions, that could occur with biases from the previous choice history (Bode et al., 2012; 
Lages & Jaworska, 2012). This design also ensured that participants actively made 
Figure 1 Experimental paradigm with single trial structure (upper panel) and participant screen 
views in the virtual environment (lower panel). Each trial began with an instruction screen that, in 
Instructed trials, told participants which colour door to select and, in Free trials, told participants to 
‘Find the star’, which allowed them to freely choose between either of the two coloured doors they 
had not chosen on the previous trial. Instructed and Free trials were interspersed to ensure that 
participants initiated a new decision on each trial. Participants were asked to make their choices at 
the start of the trial, before proceeding up a corridor. At the halfway point, the doors became visible 
and the position of each coloured door became apparent. This enabled the participants to initiate 
motor preparation to choose the appropriate door at the end of the corridor. Every correct Instructed 
choice received a star, while stars were pseudorandomly gained in Free trials. A fixation cross 
separated each trial. 
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decisions at the start of each trial, relying on internal information to make their choice, and 
that this process was dissociated from both spatial attention and motor preparation.  
Once a choice was made, participants travelled along the corridor (phase 1) by 
holding a button with their left hand. The locations of each colour door (left, middle, or right) 
were pseudo-randomised each trial, so that participants could only make their choice based 
on colour information during phase 1 of the trial. At the half-way point in the corridor (phase 
2), the doors at the end of the corridor became visible. Participants continued travelling down 
the corridor until they neared the end, where they could select one of the doors using three 
fingers of their right hand matched to the position of the three coloured doors.  
A fixation cross separated each trial. There was temporal jitter for the length of the 
corridor of approximately 4, 8 or 12s, depending on the time participants made their door 
choice, as well as temporal jitter for the length of the fixation cross between trials (3, 5 or 
7s) to enable deconvolution of the haemodynamic response function (HRF) between the 
different stages of the trial. There were five blocks of 36 trials each, consisting of equal 
numbers (6 trials) of Instructed/Free x red/green/blue rewarded doors in a pseudo-
randomised order.  
A brief questionnaire on task strategy was administered to participants at the end of 
the session outside the scanner, asking, ‘How motivated were you to find the stars?’, ‘Do 
you believe the stars were randomly hidden?’, ‘Did you use a strategy to find the stars?’ and 
a blank space to detail any specific task strategy that participants might have used. 
Participants were also interviewed verbally to elaborate on any comments on their approach 
to the task.  
Eye movements were measured using an infrared eye-tracking device (EyeLink 
1000, SR Research Ltd, Ontario, Canada). For one participant, data could not be collected 
for technical reasons. Fixations to the doors were registered for fixation events that 
corresponded to pixel regions for each of the three door locations. These pixel regions for 
each door were updated for consecutive 1s screen viewing intervals, in order to account for 
changes in visual perspective while moving in the 3D environment. The duration of eye 
fixations to each of the doors was analysed in separate time-bins over phase 2 for the 
Instructed and Free conditions with a three-way ANOVA. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (p <0.001), so a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied. 
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fMRI acquisition 
MRI volumes of the whole brain were acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T scanner 
(Erlangen, Germany) using a standard 32 channel head coil. For each of the five blocks, an 
average of 800-900 functional images (depending on speed of task completion) were 
acquired using a gradient-echo echo-planar imaging sequence (GE-EPI) with simultaneous 
multi-slice acquisition (multi-band slice acceleration factor=4, 40 axial slices, TR=700ms, 
TE=32.0ms, FA=60°, FOV 192x192mm, voxel size=3mm2, slice thickness=3mm with 10% 
slice gap). A high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan was acquired (TR=1900ms, 
TE=2.32ms, FA=9°, FOV 192×192mm, voxel size=0.9mm3). The first 12s of scans were 
discarded to avoid magnetic saturation effects.  
 
Data pre-processing 
All data was first pre-processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, University College London, London, UK). The images were spatially realigned 
using a six-parameter affine transformation to account for effects of head movement. The 
T1 structural image was co-registered to the mean of the realigned functional images and 
then spatially normalised to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space using the segment 
process of SPM8. These spatial normalisation parameters were then applied to all functional 
images, which were then spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at 
half-maximum. For multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), normalisation and smoothing were 
not conducted at this stage (see below). 
 
Partial least squares analysis  
We conducted partial least squares (PLS) analysis to identify activity in brain regions 
that underlies Free, as opposed to Instructed decisions. This analytical technique is 
particularly utilised to extract key features from high-dimensional data and is robust to 
individual variations in activity. In this case, as we expected individual differences in the 
decision-making time (and strategy), this technique would best permit to identify core 
patterns of activity for Free choices across all participants. This multivariate technique 
identifies patterns of voxel activity across the brain that covary with the experimental 
conditions (McIntosh et al., 1996), which results in a set of latent variables (LV), components 
that reflect patterns of brain activity related to the experimental conditions. The LVs are 
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generated by singular value decomposition of a single matrix that contains all participants’ 
data, yielding a singular image of voxel saliences (i.e., a brain pattern reflecting task-related 
changes), a singular profile of task saliences (i.e., the degree to which each experimental 
condition contributes to the brain pattern), and a singular value (i.e., the amount of 
covariance accounted for by the LV). We conducted a mean-centring PLS analysis, using 
the onsets of the start of the corridor, separating all trials into Instructed and Free conditions, 
for a period of 21 TR (corresponding to approximately 15s of a haemodynamic response). 
Significance for each LV was calculated by a permutation test, which assesses that a 
singular value from permuted data (resampled 500 times) is larger than the obtained value 
(McIntosh et al., 1996). A second, independent step was a bootstrap estimation of the 
standard errors (resampled 100 times) to determine the reliability of the saliences for the 
brain voxels characterising each pattern identified by the LVs (Efron & Tibshirani, 1986). A 
brain score was then calculated to represent the degree to which the pattern of brain activity 
was represented for each participant over each TR. Significance for the peak voxels was 
thresholded at a salience to standard error ratio >3, which is equivalent to p<0.001 
(Sampson et al., 1989). The regions reported showed activations across multiple time-points 
with a peak TR corresponding to approximately 8-10s, which is displayed using Mango 
(Research Imaging Institute, UTHSCSA).  
 
Multi-voxel pattern analysis 
MVPA was performed using a customised MVPA Toolbox, which has been applied 
in previous work (Bode et al., 2013; Bode et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2013), run in MATLAB in 
conjunction with SPM8. A general linear model was first estimated for each individual 
participant based on motion corrected, non-normalised, unsmoothed data to produce 
parameter estimates for each voxel in each run per participant across conditions. Beta 
images (regressors; condition x block + 6 motion correction parameters) were estimated for 
each participant in separate models, according to the type of decision category being 
examined. For the colour-choice model, the estimated beta images corresponded to the 
start of the corridor (phase 1): Instructed/Free x red/green/blue. For the position-choice 
model, the analysis of interest included beta images for the halfway point (phase 2): 
Instructed/Free x left/middle/right. The same model, incorporating the location instead of 
colour, was also run for phase 1 of the trial to check for evidence of potential planning 
unrelated to colour. A separate set of regressors (of no interest) accounted for the errors 
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(trials with incorrect responses, missing responses) in each model.  Notable choice biases 
were observed in three participants: two demonstrated a strong colour preference, and one 
demonstrated a strong position preference (fraction of selections differing by >10% above 
equal door selection). The colour preferences resulted in unbalanced blocks where one of 
the colours was never chosen, so these participants were excluded from the MVPA colour 
model analysis. 
For each model, a three-way searchlight classification analysis with chance accuracy 
= 33.3% was conducted on the parameter estimates (beta images) for each participant 
separately (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). Data for each condition and each run were extracted 
from a spherical cluster (3 voxel radius) centred in turn on each voxel in the brain, and 
subsequently transformed into pattern vectors. These vectors represented the spatial 
activation pattern for the respective experimental conditions from this particular position in 
the brain. A five-fold leave-one-out cross-validation procedure was implemented whereby a 
linear support vector machine classifier based on the LibSVM library (Chang & Lin, 2001) 
was trained on pattern vectors from all runs but one run, and then tested on the pattern 
vectors from the remaining run. In this way, data from each run was independently used as 
the test data set once while training on all other runs (see e.g., Bode et al., 2013). The 
average classification accuracy value for the respective cluster was then assigned to the 
central voxel. This procedure was repeated for each cluster in the brain to yield whole brain 
classification accuracy maps for each individual for each classification analysis of interest. 
To combine data across individuals, classification accuracy maps were registered to MNI 
space by applying the spatial normalisation parameters extracted at the pre-processing 
stage of the univariate analyses, and were subsequently smoothed using an 8mm FWHM 
Gaussian kernel. Second-level analysis was performed using SPM8. The images were 
entered into a one-sample t-test, with an explicit SPM brain mask, to identify voxels where 
classification was significantly above chance. Significance was determined at voxel-level 
p<0.05, FWE-corrected. Pairwise t-tests were performed to compare peak decoding 
accuracy between conditions. 
 
Results 
Behavioural task performance  
For the Instructed choice condition, mean performance, defined as correctly selecting 
the instructed coloured door, was 97.2% (SD=5.2%). For the Free choice condition, correct 
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performance was defined as choosing a colour that was not the same colour as chosen on 
the previous trial, and was 94.5% (SD=4.7%). All participants but two reported being at least 
somewhat motivated to find the stars. Despite being instructed that the allocation of stars 
was random, 6/22 participants stated that they believed that outcomes were not random. 
Thirteen of 22 participants reported having used a strategy to choose the doors, and 
comments in the open response section indicated a perceived awareness of having 
produced some sequence history (14/22) to establish choice patterns. Comments in the 
open response section further indicated that the majority of participants (14/22) made colour-
based choices early in the trial, before they reached the halfway point. A small number (4/22) 
reported taking into account the position of doors to finalise their decision, and a further four 
participants reported not being aware of having used any strategy, and having acted 
randomly (Table 1). An overview of choice entropy, representing how distributed each 
participant’s choices were according to colour and position, and the proportions of colours 
and positions chosen is provided in supplementary data.  
 
Table 1 Participant self-report responses on task behaviour 
Questionnaire Summary 
How motivated 
were you to find 
the stars? 
Not	at	all	 Somewhat	 Very	
2	 8	 12	
Do you believe the 
stars were 
randomly hidden? 
Yes	 No	 	
16	 6	
Did you use a 
strategy to find the 
stars? 
Yes	 No	 	
9	 13	
Open response: 
strategy 
Sequential	 Preference	 None	
14	 5	 3	
Open response: 
choice basis 
Colour	 Position	 Random	
14	 4	 4	
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Duration of eye fixations  
A three-way ANOVA with factors door, time period, and condition was conducted on 
the duration of fixations to the three doors. The factor of door was categorised as the chosen 
door, previous door (disallowed as it was chosen on the previous trial) and the alternative 
door for each condition, and was analysed over the second phase of the trial when the doors 
were visible. The second trial phase was separated further into first and second half periods 
of time to examine if differences in fixations occurred only at the initial viewing or were 
maintained over time. We found a significant main effect of time period, indicating 
significantly longer fixation durations across all doors in the first half (M=290ms, SE=13) 
compared to the second half of phase 2 (M=176ms, SE=13; F(1,20)=28.60, p<0.001). There 
was a significant main effect of condition, F(1,20)=21.80, p<0.001 and a significant main 
effect of door choice, but also a significant interaction between door and condition, 
F(1.65,33.05)=4.82, p=0.02 (Figure 2). Post hoc tests of this interaction effect were 
conducted using paired t-tests (Bonferroni-corrected) to compare Free versus Instructed 
conditions separately for each door. These showed a significantly longer duration of fixations 
to the alternative door in Free decisions than in Instructed decisions, t(20)=5.07, p<0.001. 
There was a trend towards a longer duration of fixations to the previous door in Free trials 
than Instructed trials, but this did not survive Bonferroni correction, t(20)=2.29, p=0.03. 
There was no significant difference in fixation durations to the chosen door between 
conditions, t(20)=0.64, p=0.5. To check for anticipatory eye movements, we also examined 
Figure 2 Mean duration of fixations on each of the doors for Instructed (blue) and Free (red) 
decisions, during the second half of the trial when the doors were visible. Results of a three-way 
ANOVA reveal significant differences in fixation duration to the three doors between conditions 
(p<0.001). The time spent fixating on the chosen door and previous door did not differ between 
conditions but time spent fixating on the alternative door, which was still available to choose, was 
greater in Free trials (*** p<0.001). 
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the total number of fixations to the screen prior to the doors being visible and found only a 
trend, but no significant differences between conditions, t(20)=1.88, p=0.07. There was also 
no significant difference in target fixation latency on the chosen door, once visible, between 
conditions, t(20)=1.22, p=0.2. 
 
 PLS whole-brain networks 
The PLS analysis for two conditions at the start of the trial onset permitted only one LV, 
which was found to be significant (100% of model variance, p<0.001), and differentiated 
Free from Instructed decisions (Figure 3A-B). It is important to note that regions of activity 
for each condition reflect voxel activity that covaries with the onset of either a Free or 
Instructed trial. Therefore, activity in the ‘positive’ network identifies a whole-brain network 
that is more active for Free decisions, whereas the ‘negative’ network includes regions more 
active for Instructed decisions. In the Free condition, there was widespread engagement of 
regions of the frontoparietal network, including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
extending through to the supplementary motor areas (SMA), the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), including the inferior and middle frontal gyri (IFG/MFG), and inferior parietal 
lobes. Activity in the bilateral insular cortices was also associated with Free decision trials. 
Instructed trials were associated with a relative increase in activity in the medial prefrontal 
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex.  
 
MVPA predictive choice patterns 
We analysed the neural representation of colour choice at both the start and halfway 
points of the trial but did not find significant clusters in either Free or Instructed conditions. 
Sub-threshold clusters were, however, evident in the visual cortex at the start of the trial, at 
an uncorrected significance threshold (p<0.001) with peak MNI coordinates at [-15 -79 10] 
when colour conditions were combined across Free and Instructed trials. No above-chance 
decoding of the door position was found at the start of the trial, confirming that participants 
were not relying on the position information available later in the trial to make their choices. 
At the halfway point, in both Instructed and Free choice conditions, the choice corresponding 
to the position of the door could be decoded significantly above chance in a cluster including 
the left primary motor and somatosensory regions (Figure 4). The classifier accuracy was 
64% for Instructed choice and 60% for Free choice, corresponding to 31% and 27% 
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Figure 3 Partial least squares analysis separates networks of regions where activations covaried 
with the onset of Free decisions (red) and Instructed decisions (blue) at the start of the trial. A) For 
Free decisions, regions of the frontoparietal and salience networks were active, including the 
anterior cingulate cortex, supplementary motor area, bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior 
parietal lobes and insular cortices. Instructed decisions engaged a separate network, with activation 
predominantly in the medial prefrontal cortex. Results are thresholded at a bootstrap ratio (BSR) of 
3 and displayed using Mango (Research Imaging Institute, UTHSCSA). B) Mean brain scores of the 
LV1 pattern (p<0.001) across the entire brain of each participant for Free (red) and Instructed (blue) 
decisions over 21 TR scans (TR=0.7s; equivalent to 15s of a haemodynamic response) shows a 
functional differentiation between conditions. Note that the ‘negative’ brain score here for Instructed 
decisions indicates that this network was dissociated from Free decision activity, and does not 
represent deactivation.  
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above chance, respectively (peak MNI coordinates: Instructed [-42 -25 58], Free [-42 -28 
58], p<0.05 FWE-corrected). A second cluster in the visual cortex also contained 
discriminatory information, with classification accuracy of 62% for Instructed choice and 51% 
for Free choice (peak MNI coordinates: Instructed [9 -82 13], Free [15 -82 16], p<0.05 FWE-
corrected). Decoding accuracy in the visual cortex was significantly higher in the Instructed 
condition compared to the Free condition, t(21)=5.238, p <0.001. Decoding accuracy in the 
motor cortex did not differ significantly between conditions but showed a similar trend, 
t(21)=1.828, p=0.08.  
 
Discussion 
Our findings reveal new insight into the preparation of voluntary decisions in a 
dynamic task environment, starting from initial intention to action execution. Using PLS, we 
show that regions corresponding to the frontoparietal and salience networks were activated 
when participants freely prepared to make their own choices rather than when they were 
instructed which door to choose. This activity was evident from the start of the trial, prior to 
any visual stimuli revealing the position of the doors ahead. Notably, this finding suggests 
that the neural activity during this preparatory period reflected choice selection, a central 
Figure 4 Areas in which a searchlight analysis revealed significant decoding of the door position 
participants were preparing to choose (left, middle or right) in corridor task phase 2 (when the doors 
became visible). A) Decoding accuracy was highest across conditions in the left motor cortex, but a 
second cluster in the visual cortex also contained discriminatory information (p<0.05 FWE-
corrected). The t-score represents the group-level significance of decoding. Results are presented 
on a 3D-rendered standard brain template with Mango, thresholded at p<0.001 for ease of viewing. 
B) Decoding accuracy in the peak coordinates from (A) based on the position participants were 
preparing to select, separated by region and condition (Instructed in blue; Free in red). In the left 
motor cortex, there is a trend towards higher decoding in the Instructed condition and in the visual 
cortex this difference is highly statistically significant (*** p<0.001).  
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process of free decision-making, rather than any additional demands from attentional 
selection or motor preparation. Decoding of the specific colour choice was not possible in 
either condition, but we found robust decoding of the motor choice from the time that the 
door positions became visible. During this later period of motor preparation, we also found 
that participants fixated longer on the alternative doors when their choice was freely made 
than when instructed. Together, these findings raise the possibility that proactive preparation 
of free decisions engages ongoing demands on choice selection and maintenance, which 
might be more effortful for free decisions as alternatives continue to be considered. 
Results of this study provide support for a central role of the frontoparietal network in 
proactive preparation of free decisions. Regions of the frontoparietal network have been 
commonly associated with free decisions, which require selection between multiple options 
(Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 2005; Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 
2012; Turk et al., 2004; Walton et al., 2004). Thimm et al. (2012) proposed that the 
frontoparietal network may function as a free choice network that is recruited independent 
of modality, based on findings that perceptual and not only motor tasks recruited this 
network. Our study extends this proposal by finding recruitment of the frontoparietal network 
during a preparatory decision-making period, separate from spatial attention processes or 
conflict between competing action plans, both of which are known to recruit the frontoparietal 
network (Scolari et al., 2015). This interpretation is also in line with other findings showing 
the involvement of the frontoparietal network when intentions had to be kept in memory 
before execution, in particular during the storage period (Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2011). 
As in our study, the same network did not necessarily encode the outcome of the decision 
(Gilbert, 2011).  
Frontoparietal activity has been found to scale with the amount of cognitive control 
required by tasks and, in particular, the amount of uncertainty within a decision (Fan, 2014; 
Fan et al., 2014). The common recruitment of this network during free decisions is thought 
to result from the greater demand on selection processes required when choosing between 
multiple options, compared to simple goal maintenance for instructed choices (Bunge et al., 
2002; Duncan, 2013; Frith, 1991; Hadland et al., 2001; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Thimm et 
al., 2012). The DLPFC in particular has been suggested to be a central node of a higher 
order free choice network that is recruited to enable free selection among alternatives (Rowe 
et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012), both for rules and for actions (Rowe et al., 2008). However, 
in previous studies on DLPFC activation, it has not been possible to dissociate the effects 
of choice selection from the effects of motor processing (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003). Our 
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finding of DLPFC activity for free mental colour selection at a time preceding motor 
preparation provides good evidence for its role in free choice selection. The pre-SMA, 
another region, which has been commonly associated with voluntary choices across 
modalities (Cunnington et al., 2002; Cunnington et al., 2005; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, et al., 
2004; Rowe et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2008; Thimm et al., 2012), was also recruited for free 
choice trials. In accordance with these previous studies, activity of the DLPFC and pre-SMA 
are indicative of choice selection occurring for free decisions during this proactive period.   
Furthermore, we found activity of the ACC, which has previously been found to be 
more activated for free decisions than forced, or specified, decisions (Forstmann et al., 2006; 
Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004; Walton et al., 2004). Some have suggested that activity 
in this region relates specifically to conflict between motor plans in related tasks (Thimm et 
al., 2012). However, recruitment of the ACC at a time preceding action preparation suggest 
a role related more broadly to information processing. One theory suggests that the ACC 
routes information on the basis of information content, or uncertainty, which in this case 
would relate to the higher number of options to compare and choose between in the free 
choice trials compared to instructed trials (Fan, 2014). Another possibility is that ACC 
activation in this task may have been related to its role in conflict monitoring (Botvinick, 
2007), as the restriction of choice options based on the previous choice required conflict 
resolution to inhibit the option that could not be chosen on that trial. Although conflict is 
arguably inevitable when choosing between highly similar options, as in most free choice 
tasks, there is some evidence that conflict and voluntary choice selection engage different 
regions of the ACC (Nachev et al., 2005). Activation in our study cannot distinguish between 
the two.  
The ACC together with the insula also forms a salience network responsible for 
detecting informative stimuli (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al., 2007). The bilateral insula 
are a hub that integrate internal and perceptual inputs, which are then directed for attentional 
processing and goal-directed activity (Menon & Uddin, 2010). Similar to the ACC, the insula 
is also modulated by uncertainty in the expected choice outcomes (Critchley et al., 2001; 
Knutson & Greer, 2008; Mohr et al., 2010). Previous studies have found greater activation 
of this area for preference-based decisions over externally-dictated choices (Paulus & 
Frank, 2003; Turk et al., 2004). In addition to the anticipation of positive outcomes, the insula 
have been found to be activated preceding uncertain losses, which suggests that this 
network may be activated in arousal in general (Knutson & Greer, 2008). Our finding of 
salience network activity may be related to participants’ uncertain expectation of receiving a 
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star from their choice. It has also been suggested that salience network activity is likely to 
be important during embodied decisions, where activity could enable switching between the 
various sources of information (Seeley et al., 2007). In our study, participants needed to 
attend to information related to colour preference and value expectation as well as the 
upcoming visual cues in the virtual environment. 
Although participant choices led to random reward outcomes, it is likely that the 
recent reward history influenced the expectations of the optimal choice for participants to 
make (Haggard & Eitam, 2015; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). The 
tendency to see patterns in random events is well documented, and might have led to more 
systematic response patterns and strategies (Guth & Frankmann, 1965; Lages & Jaworska, 
2012; Tricomi et al., 2004; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Yu & Cohen, 2008). We aimed to 
minimise these effects by disallowing repetition of the previous choice (Allefeld et al., 2013; 
Bode et al., 2014; Lages et al., 2013; Lages & Jaworska, 2012; Soon et al., 2014; Soon et 
al., 2008) and by clearly instructing participants that the distribution of stars was random. 
Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of participants suspected that the stars were not 
random, in line with previous reports that participants demonstrate the use of strategies 
when faced with random outcomes (Tricomi et al., 2004). Interestingly, these effects have 
been found to be enhanced when individuals perceive a lack of control (Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008), which could have occurred in our task due to the inability to predict where the stars 
were hidden. It appears that even when individuals are aware that the environment is 
stochastic, given the freedom to choose, there is a tendency to track the statistical properties 
of the environment in order to try to optimise choice outcomes.  
It should be noted that instructed trials permitted one choice that was always 
rewarded whereas free choice trials required making a choice with an unknown outcome 
(reward or no reward). This design was chosen so as not to introduce additional, potentially 
negative, responses from being forced to choose a door that did not lead to reward 
(O’Doherty et al., 2003). Previous studies that did employ variable rewards in both free and 
forced conditions also found comparatively less activation in regions such as the caudate 
and dorsal ACC in forced conditions and, thus, concluded that the contingency between 
making a choice and the outcome was the critical factor (Tricomi et al., 2004; Walton et al., 
2004). In our study, we focused more specifically on the choice selection process and found 
no anticipatory recruitment of reward networks at this time. Therefore, while it is likely that 
the uncertainty in choosing between multiple options contributed to differences in neural 
activity, the precise role of reward cannot be determined. This is a question for future studies. 
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With this study, we also sought to determine if it was possible to predict free decisions 
in a more complex decision-making context. Surprisingly, we could not predict the decisions 
based on colour choice at any point in the trial. This was true for free as well as instructed 
trials, where participants necessarily had a colour in mind. These results may be due to a 
lack of sensitivity in decoding, as subthreshold clusters in the visual cortex were evident at 
the start of the trial and colour choices could be decoded (albeit at an uncorrected threshold) 
when free and instructed trials were analysed together. Furthermore, the participants’ near-
perfect accuracy in appropriately selecting one of the available colour doors and the 
absence of position decoding in the first trial phase provide strong evidence that participants 
did indeed make initial decisions based on colour. Once the doors became visible and initial 
colour choices could be mapped onto positions to generate action choices, we found robust 
decoding for the position of the door participants were preparing to choose. The cluster in 
the left motor cortex most likely reflects preparatory motor plans differentiating between the 
fingers associated with selecting the left, middle or right doors. Finger-specific action plans 
have been reported in other modalities (Quandt et al., 2012). A second cluster in the visual 
cortex most likely indicates visual attention as participants fixated for longer on the door of 
choice.  
In contrast to previous reports, we did not observe information predicting the decision 
outcomes in the frontoparietal network (Soon et al., 2008; Soon et al., 2013), nor in medial 
and lateral prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007), even though PLS analysis found this 
network to be highly activated for free choices. It is possible that although these regions 
were involved in information processing, the content of the specific choices was encoded in 
separate regions. This dissociation between information encoding and retrieval has 
previously been reported for delayed intentions (Gilbert, 2011). However, it can be noted 
that, as the door associated with reward changed throughout the experiment, according to 
the pseudo-random receipt of stars, the only constant distinguishing features between doors 
were colour and position. Higher-order decision factors may have been averaged across 
trials as the perception of the optimal door to choose changed. We also did not find 
frontopolar cortex activity to be predictive of decisions outcomes. It has been proposed that 
this region mediates cognitive branching between options that are held in the background 
(Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007), for example in a delayed intention (Gilbert, 2011) or sequential 
choice scenario (Soon et al., 2008). As we tried to minimise the reliance of choice on 
statistical tracking, with each trial requiring a new decision to be made after the cue, we 
expected less involvement of this region. Importantly, during the second task phase, higher-
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level planning areas may not have been predictive of the decisions, as participants were 
already able to transform their initial choices into action plans at this point. 
Interestingly, we found that decoding was slightly lower in the motor cortex and 
significantly lower in the visual cortex for free decisions as compared to instructed decisions. 
Patterns of eye fixations may provide some explanation for this finding. There was a 
systematic and significant difference in the duration of fixations between conditions as 
participants approached the doors: Fixations to the chosen door were equal between 
conditions, but in free choice trials the duration of fixations to the alternative available door 
throughout this period was longer. One possibility is that our neural findings may relate to a 
feature of free decisions that would usually be overlooked in conventional, non-dynamic 
tasks: namely, individuals may continue to consider their available options throughout the 
time leading up to a decision. This freedom of choice could lead to more proactive visual 
exploration of the alternative option, as well as formation of a less stable choice 
representation, which may explain the weaker decoding of decision outcomes that we found 
in free choice trials. Fixations to visual stimuli have been shown to influence upcoming 
decisions (Krajbich et al., 2010; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012), and ongoing consideration of 
the alternative door may reflect efforts to resolve uncertainty in deciding which door to select. 
However, it might also be that an inherent feature of free decisions is to ‘keep one’s options 
open’ (Klyubin et al., 2005). 
In summary, we show that free decisions were associated with activity of the 
frontoparietal network and salience network during a proactive decision period from intention 
formation to final action selection. We also find that the specific upcoming choice could be 
decoded from patterns of activity relating to motor preparation once the specific location of 
the selected door was known. This was evident in both motor and visual cortices in both 
conditions, although with lower decoding accuracy for free decisions than the instructed 
decisions. Eye fixations further suggested that participants engaged more with the 
alternative door throughout the decision period when they were free to choose. These 
results suggest that free decisions recruit networks for choice selection in preparation for a 
decision, and that neural representations at this time reflect ongoing proactive processes 
relevant for decision-making and maintenance of free decisions. Differences in engagement 
with the environment raise the possibility that free decisions allow an individual to hold 
choice options in a more active state during proactive preparation. Our study therefore 
constitutes an important step towards a better understanding of how decisions are made in 
more realistic ecological environments. 
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Supplementary Data 
Participant choice behaviour shows that overall there was well-balanced selection of 
the three doors according to colour, as well as position (Table S1). To further investigate 
choice behaviour, we calculated selection entropy (SE), which provides an indication of the 
randomness, or the sampling behaviour, of the choices made by participants (Zhang & 
Rowe, 2015). The SE provides a measure of the sampling over all available options over 
the period of time selected. The SE at each trial 𝑖 with a preceding window length 𝑛 is 
calculated according to: 
 	𝑆𝐸 𝑖 = 	𝐻 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑆𝑒𝑡 = , 𝑏, 𝑐  
 𝑆𝐸 = 	−	 P 𝐴3 = m, 𝐶3 = 𝑘 	𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 𝐴3 = m|𝐶3 = 𝑘 , (𝑖 − 𝑛 + 1) ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑖@A{C,D,E}GA{H,I,J}		  
 
In this study, the choices were conditional on the previously chosen door, with three 
choice sets (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) corresponding to the unavailability of the red, green, or blue colour doors 
because the colour had been selected on the previous trial. The possible colour choices m 
participants could make were red, green, or blue, with two responses available on each trial. 
For position choices, the choice set referred to the position of the door that corresponded to 
the unavailable colour. The possible position choices were the remaining two actions. We 
calculated SE for all three doors for the duration of the experiment (𝑛 = 90) for each 
participant (Figure S1). It was evident that two participants (S18, S19) had notable choice 
biases, which meant there was insufficient data on each run and their data was excluded 
from MVPA to avoid unbalancing the classifier training.  
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Table S1 Participant choice proportions, separated by door colour and position. In most cases, there 
was approximately even sampling, centred around 0.33 (three possible choices). 
	 Red	 Blue	 Green	 Left	 Middle	 Right	
1	 0.32	 0.33	 0.35	 0.34	 0.36	 0.30	
2	 0.31	 0.32	 0.37	 0.28	 0.44	 0.28	
3	 0.32	 0.32	 0.36	 0.31	 0.34	 0.34	
4	 0.34	 0.33	 0.33	 0.26	 0.33	 0.41	
5	 0.36	 0.32	 0.32	 0.27	 0.36	 0.37	
6	 0.34	 0.32	 0.34	 0.31	 0.36	 0.33	
7	 0.31	 0.33	 0.36	 0.31	 0.34	 0.35	
8	 0.33	 0.34	 0.32	 0.32	 0.40	 0.28	
9	 0.32	 0.32	 0.36	 0.31	 0.35	 0.34	
10	 0.33	 0.33	 0.34	 0.32	 0.37	 0.31	
11	 0.33	 0.33	 0.34	 0.35	 0.33	 0.32	
12	 0.34	 0.35	 0.31	 0.28	 0.32	 0.40	
13	 0.34	 0.33	 0.32	 0.28	 0.36	 0.36	
14	 0.29	 0.38	 0.33	 0.31	 0.38	 0.31	
15	 0.33	 0.34	 0.33	 0.33	 0.28	 0.39	
16	 0.38	 0.30	 0.32	 0.31	 0.41	 0.29	
17	 0.33	 0.30	 0.37	 0.36	 0.31	 0.34	
18	 0.43	 0.38	 0.19	 0.32	 0.34	 0.34	
19	 0.22	 0.37	 0.42	 0.28	 0.36	 0.36	
20	 0.36	 0.34	 0.30	 0.28	 0.37	 0.35	
21	 0.34	 0.32	 0.33	 0.33	 0.34	 0.33	
22	 0.36	 0.29	 0.36	 0.33	 0.39	 0.27	
 
 
 
Figure S1 Selection entropy for each participant, showing the distribution of choices across available 
options over the course of the experiment (perfect sampling = 1). Notable biases were observed in 
two participants (S18, S19), which meant exclusion from MVPA due to lack of sufficient choices to 
train the classifier. 
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Preface 
 
In Chapter 2, I established that free decisions could be predicted from neural activity in a 
dynamic task environment and were associated with proactive choice selection processes. 
I also gained insight that free decisions were less strongly encoded and associated with 
greater visual attention to alternative options. This leads to the possibility that a key 
characteristic of free decisions is the ongoing consideration of potential options. The aim of 
the following chapter is to specifically investigate the neural encoding of option availability 
and its relation to perceived freedom. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, 
I uniquely manipulate the availability of options and test its influence on the subjective 
experience of free will by collecting self-reports on perceived freedom. In contrast to defining 
free choice on the basis of a third-person view (free or instructed), this permits the 
opportunity to identify the neural correlates underlying an individual’s subjective experience 
of free will. 
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Chapter 3.  
Perceived freedom of choice is associated with neural 
predictions of option availability 
Rens, N., Bode, S., Cunnington, R. 
Submitted to NeuroImage 
 
Abstract 
Freedom of choice has been defined as the opportunity to choose alternative plans 
of action. In this fMRI study, we investigated how the perceived freedom of choice and the 
underlying neural correlates are influenced by the availability of options. Participants made 
an initial free choice between left or right doors before beginning a virtual walk along a 
corridor. At the mid-point of the corridor, lock cues appeared to reveal whether one or both 
doors remained available, requiring participants either to select a particular door or allowing 
them to freely choose to stay or switch their choice. We found that participants rated trials 
as free when they were able to carry out their initial choice, but even more so when both 
doors remained available. Multi-voxel pattern analysis showed that upcoming choices could 
initially be decoded from visual cortices before the appearance of the lock cues, and 
additionally from the motor cortex after the lock cues had confirmed which doors were open. 
When participants were able to maintain the same choice that they originally selected, the 
availability of alternative options was represented in fine-grained patterns of activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Further, decoding accuracy in this region correlated with the 
subjective level of freedom that participants reported. These results suggest that there is 
neural encoding of the availability of alternative options in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
and the degree of this encoding predicts an individual’s perceived freedom of choice. 
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Introduction 
Freedom of choice is associated with the availability of choice (Banja, 2015; Catania, 
1975; Monroe et al., 2014). It has been suggested that having options available to us is 
inherently rewarding because it fosters a sense of control, by allowing us to choose the 
option we believe to be optimal (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Leotti et al., 2010; Ryan & Deci, 
2006). Others have proposed that individuals seek to keep a number of options open in 
order to maintain a state where they foresee greater potential to influence their environment 
(Friston et al., 2015; Klyubin et al., 2005). Previous findings suggest that neural 
representations of an upcoming choice reflect the number of options under consideration, 
where free choices are associated with more flexible preparation of multiple options (Filevich 
& Haggard, 2013; Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). The availability and encoding of options may 
therefore influence the perceived freedom of a choice while individuals prepare to make 
decisions.  
Freedom of choice is commonly considered to depend on the availability of options 
from which to choose and to be diminished by external constraints that limit choice (Monroe 
& Malle, 2010). This implies that an individual’s experience of volition is innately tied to 
perception of their possibilities in the external world. Computational theories propose that in 
dynamic environments individuals maintain an internal model of the environment that 
represents the potential actions that they can take at any one time (Klyubin et al., 2005; 
Klyubin et al., 2008). This predicts that an individual is driven to be in a state of 
‘empowerment’, where one believes that multiple differing future states could be attained 
through their actions (Klyubin et al., 2005; Klyubin et al., 2008). The belief that an individual 
can reach these future states may be supported by maintaining multiple action 
representations online during the process of preparing an upcoming decision (Cisek, 2006; 
Filevich & Haggard, 2013).  
In action selection tasks, it has been found that neural representations of all available 
options are initially activated and neural activity for the chosen option increases over time 
leading to a decision, concurrent with a decrease in activity for the non-chosen option (Cisek, 
2006; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). Studies suggest that individuals continue to consider 
available options throughout the time leading to a decision when given the freedom to 
choose, in contrast to when they are instructed (Rens et al., submitted, Fleming et al., 2009). 
Further, evidence suggests that freely chosen actions are less strongly encoded in the 
preparatory decision period than instructed actions and, in turn, more flexibly updated in 
response to environmental cues (Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). This 
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raises the possibility that free decisions are associated with a state in which the alternative, 
unselected options remain actively encoded (Filevich & Haggard, 2013; Fleming et al., 
2009).  
Investigating the perceived freedom of choice provides the opportunity to identify 
where free choices, and their associated subjective experience, arise in the brain (Filevich 
et al., 2013). This approach was spearheaded by Filevich et al. (2013), who studied the 
subjective experience of free choice in a task requiring participants to freely generate a 
number in a random sequence. These authors found that participants rated choices as less 
free if there were fewer perceived options available (Filevich et al., 2013). However, the 
relationship between the availability of options and the brain regions that differed in activity 
according to subjective ratings was not directly investigated. We reasoned that if the 
awareness of the options in the environment contributes to the sense of freedom individuals 
feel in their upcoming choices, the subjective experience of freedom may be related to the 
neural representation of an upcoming choice. 
In order to investigate whether perceived freedom of choice is related to neural 
encoding of available options, we designed a decision-making task in a virtual environment 
that participants performed during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). At the 
start of each trial, participants were asked to freely choose between left and right doors that 
were situated at the end of a corridor. After making their choices, participants advanced up 
the corridor to a halfway point, where lock cues indicated whether one or both doors 
remained open. If both doors were open, participants were free to either continue with their 
original choice or switch to the other door; if one door was locked, participants were required 
to select the remaining open door. This resulted in some trials in which participants were 
forced to switch, but crucially also trials in which participants could continue with their initial 
choice, but the alternative option was removed. Participants rated how free they felt their 
choice to be at the end of each trial. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), this design 
allowed us to examine the neural encoding of choices prior to door selection and, more 
importantly, to predict the availability of an alternative option. Specifically, in cases where 
participants continued with their initial choice, we examined differences in neural 
representation when the alternative door was available compared to when it was not. We 
then examined the relationship between the decoding of options and participants’ perceived 
freedom of choice. We hypothesised that trials in which both doors remained open would be 
rated as freer than trials where one door was locked, even when participants could continue 
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with their initial choice, and that the perceived freedom of choice would correspond to neural 
representations of the availability of an alternative option.    
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-five participants were recruited after providing written informed consent. All 
participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, and no history of 
psychiatric disease, neurological trauma or disorder. One participant was excluded for not 
following the task instructions, and data from the remaining 24 participants were used for 
the behavioural analyses (15 female, mean age 24 years, range 20-32 years). Participants 
were monetarily compensated for their time. The University of Queensland Medical 
Research Ethics Committee approved the experiment. 
Experimental task 
Participants underwent a brief training session with instructions outside the scanner 
prior to completing the experimental task in a 3T MRI scanner. The task was based in a 
virtual environment, presented using Psychtoolbox on MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc., Natick, 
MA, USA). The paradigm is shown in Figure 1. The task environment consisted of a corridor 
with two doors at the end that participants needed to advance towards to select. Participants 
viewed a first-person perspective of the three-dimensional corridor from their current 
position, which updated continuously as they moved. At the start of the trial, a message to 
‘Choose now’ appeared, asking participants to choose freely at this time between the left 
and right doors. They subsequently advanced up the corridor by holding down a button with 
the left index finger. At the halfway point, left and right lock cues appeared for 0.8s. If both 
locks were displayed as open, both doors were available and participants were permitted to 
either stay with their initial choice (Choice Stay) or to change their mind and select the other 
door (Choice Switch). If one of the locks was closed while the other one was open, 
participants could only select whichever door remained unlocked. According to the door the 
participants had initially chosen, this was either congruent with their initial choice (No Choice 
Stay) or it forced them to change their selection to the other door (No Choice Switch). In 
summary, while each trial always started out with a free choice, the experimental 
manipulation at halfway point resulted in four conditions, which differed in a) Choice 
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Availability, i.e. whether the alternative door was still available, and b) Choice Response, 
i.e. whether a stay or switch decision occurred.  
The distance of the corridor from the start to halfway and from halfway to doors was 
equivalent to approximately 4s for each section, with small variation introduced by 
participant key presses. Participants acted on their decision as they reached the doors by 
using the right index or middle finger for left and right doors, respectively. A star appeared 
after selection of any available door as a token reward. If participants chose a locked door, 
a red cross appeared and the trial was recorded as an error. Catch trials occurred 
periodically (6 trials per block) in which a stop sign cue was presented shortly after 
participants started to move up the corridor. Participants had a brief time window of 1s to 
input which door they were planning to choose. These trials were designed to ensure that 
participants remained attentive and followed instructions to choose a door at the start of 
each corridor. Longer response times were interpreted as a failure of having formed an initial 
choice, and an error resulted. 
Following each trial, participants provided a rating of their perceived level of freedom 
on a free-sliding visual analogue scale from ‘Not free’ (0) to ‘Very free’ (10) (Filevich et al., 
2013). Participants were instructed to give this rating according to their own interpretation of 
“free”. A final screen also prompted them to indicate whether their decision had changed 
during the trial using a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response screen, on which the position of the response 
alternatives was counterbalanced to circumvent stereotypical and automated responding. 
This allowed us to determine the initial decision for each trial, given the combination of 
condition (displayed locks) and final selection. Each trial was separated by a fixation cross, 
jittered at 3, 5 or 7s to enable deconvolution of the haemodynamic response function (HRF). 
There were five functional runs of 24 trials, each with an equal number of pseudo-
randomised Choice and No Choice trials. A brief questionnaire on the perception of the task 
conditions was administered at the end of the session once outside the scanner, asking 
participants to rate the subjective level of freedom of the different decision conditions and 
provide detail on their experience and any decision-making strategies. 
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Figure 1 Experimental paradigm in the virtual environment for a single trial. At the start of each trial, 
the corridor with two doors at the end became visible and text appeared, asking participants to 
“Choose now” before they began to move up the corridor. At the halfway point, lock cues appeared, 
indicating whether one or both doors were available (“unlocked”). The position of the open locks 
corresponded to the position of the doors that were unlocked. Participants continued to the end of 
the corridor, where they selected either the left or right door. Every choice for an open door resulted 
in a star that was displayed after choosing the door. Participants then reported “How free” they felt 
their choice had been and, finally, indicated whether their choice had changed during the course of 
the trial. The trial shown gives an example of a No Choice Stay trial, where the participant initially 
chose the right door, and the halfway cue revealed that this door was available, but the left door was 
locked. Catch trials occurred periodically, represented by a stop sign cue appearing early in the trial, 
to ensure that participants actively made decisions at the beginning of each trial. 
 
fMRI acquisition  
MRI volumes of the whole brain were acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T scanner 
(Erlangen, Germany) using a standard 32-channel head coil. Functional images were 
acquired until the end of each block (depending on speed of task completion) using a 
gradient-echo echo-planar imaging sequence (GE-EPI) with simultaneous multi-slice 
acquisition (multi-band slice acceleration factor=4, 44 axial slices, TR=800ms, TE=30.0ms, 
FA=60°, FOV 200x200mm, voxel size=2.7mm2, slice thickness=2.7mm with 10% slice gap). 
A high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan was acquired (TR=4000ms, TE=2.89ms, 
FA=6°/7°, FOV 256×256mm, voxel size=1mm3). Five functional runs with approximately 
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600-700 volumes were recorded, according to individual time to complete each trial. The 
first 12s of scans of each run were discarded to avoid magnetic saturation effects.  
Data pre-processing 
All data was first pre-processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, University College London, London, UK). The images were spatially realigned 
using a six-parameter affine transformation to account for effects of participant movement. 
As MVPA was performed on the data, no further spatial normalisation or smoothing was 
applied at this stage. However, the T1 structural image was co-registered to the mean of the 
realigned functional images and then spatially normalised to MNI space using the segment 
process of SPM8 to obtain normalisation parameters for the MVPA accuracy maps. 
 
Multi-voxel pattern analysis 
MVPA was performed using custom scripts run in MATLAB (Bode et al., 2013) in 
conjunction with SPM8. A first-level general linear model (GLM) was first estimated for each 
individual participant based on motion corrected, non-normalised, unsmoothed data to 
produce parameter estimates for each voxel in each run and each condition. Beta images 
(condition x run + six motion correction parameters per run) were estimated for each 
participant. Separate GLMs were run according to the type of decision category being 
examined. For the model of door choice, each trial was sorted by decision (Left or Right), 
separately for the two phases of the trial, resulting in two regressors for the trial start to 
halfway point and a second set of two regressors for the period between cue until the door 
choice. The model was the basis for a two-way classification analysis with chance accuracy 
= 50%. A second model, to classify between Choice Stay and No Choice Stay conditions 
was designed to investigate patterns of activity associated with the availability of choice 
options when the actual behaviour (to stay with the initially chosen door) was identical. As 
this distinction was only meaningful for the second half of the trial, regressors were based 
on the period between halfway point and door selection. The model was the basis for a two-
way classification analysis with chance accuracy = 50%. As behavioural results showed that 
participants rarely freely chose to switch their door choice, no further models including 
Switch conditions were analysed. In all models, an additional regressor of-no-interest 
accounted for catch trials and errors and was not included in the following decoding 
analyses. Two participants exhibited a strong position bias for the left door (>70% trials), 
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which provided insufficient data to train left and right choices, and were therefore excluded 
from MVPA. 
A standard searchlight approach (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) based on the parameter 
estimates from each run (Bode et al., 2013; Haynes et al., 2007) was then applied to data 
from each individual participant separately. Pattern vectors for each condition were 
constructed from data extracted from a spherical cluster (3 voxel radius) centred in turn on 
each voxel in the brain. Next, a linear support vector machine classifier based on the LibSVM 
library (Chang & Lin, 2011) was trained on pattern vectors from the same cluster from all 
runs but one and tested on the remaining run. This analysis was cross-validated five times 
by independently repeating the training of the classifier on data from all combinations of four 
runs and using the data from each left-out run as the test data once. The average 
classification accuracy across these cross-validation steps from the respective cluster was 
assigned to its central voxel. This way, after running the analysis for all possible clusters in 
the brain, whole-brain classification accuracy maps for each individual were created 
separately for each of the classification analyses. To prepare the data for group-level 
statistical analyses, the individual classification accuracy maps were spatially normalised to 
the standard MNI template in SPM and smoothed using an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
The accuracy maps were then entered into a one-sample t-test to identify voxels where 
classification was significantly above chance. Statistical maps were reported for clusters ³ 
10, at a voxel-level threshold corrected for multiple comparisons (p<0.05 FWE-corrected).  
	
Behavioural and neural correlation analyses 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed on ratings of perceived 
freedom of choice for the factors Choice Availability (Choice or No Choice) and Choice 
Response (Stay or Switch). Significant interaction effects were followed with pairwise t-tests, 
Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons. In order to investigate relationships between 
the perceived freedom of choice ratings with decoding accuracy, we normalised participants’ 
ratings using z-transformation. We then ran Pearson correlations between the peak 
classification accuracy in each significant cluster from the Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay 
classification analysis and normalised perceived freedom of choice ratings across 
participants. This analysis aimed to provide an indicator of whether the discriminability 
between neural patterns that related to the availability of choice alternatives would 
correspond to perceived freedom of choice. Finally, we calculated a Spearman correlation 
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between the classification accuracy for the same analysis (Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) 
in the same clusters and the individual probability of Choice Switch trials to determine the 
relationship between neural representation of alternative options and the likelihood of 
participants to choose to switch.  
 
Results 
Behavioural performance and free choice ratings  
Participants performed the task according to instructions, on average selecting the 
available door on 98.5% (SD=3.6%) of No Choice trials and responding in time to 96.7% 
(SD=4.5%) of the catch trials. Door selection was well balanced overall with a slight bias 
towards the left door, which was selected with the index finger, in both task trials (M=54.1%, 
SD=12.2%) and catch trials (M=53.6%, SD=16.3%). Of note, this included two participants 
who exhibited a strong bias of greater than 80%. Switches were reported on 47.8% 
(SD=6.2%) of No Choice trials, in line with the chance nature of selecting the same door as 
the pseudorandom task assignment. In Choice trials, participants on average only opted to 
switch doors on 17.3% (SD=22.1%) of the trials (Choice Switch). However, the proportion 
of Choice Switch trials greatly varied across participants (range 0 to 71.7%). Four 
participants never chose to switch, so free ratings were not available for their Choice Switch 
trials. In the post-session questionnaire, when asked on what basis participants judged how 
free their decisions were, participants indicated the ability to perform their own initial choice 
(17/24), the availability of options (10/24) and the feeling of the decision (4/24; 
Supplementary Data). 
Average ratings of perceived freedom of choice differed across conditions (Figure 2). 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Choice Availability, 
F(1,19)=45.608, p<0.001, a main effect of Choice Response, F(1,19)=26.651, p<0.001, and 
most importantly, a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1,19)=26.607, p<0.001. 
Post-hoc t-tests, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons, showed that Choice trials 
were rated as freer than No Choice trials in both cases where participants stayed with their 
initial choice (t(23)=4.885, p<0.001; Choice Stay: M=8.24, SD=1.28, No Choice Stay: 
M=6.37, SD=1.76) and switched to the alternative door (t(19)=6.891, p<0.001; Choice 
Switch: M=8.13, SD=1.52, No Choice Switch: M=3.17, SD=2.02). No Choice Stay trials were 
also perceived as significantly freer than No Choice Switch trials, t(23)=5.944, p<0.001, but 
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there was no significant difference in ratings between Choice Stay trials and Choice Switch 
trials, t(19)= 0.432, p=0.7. 
 
Figure 2 Average ratings of perceived freedom of choice given on a sliding scale of 0-10 after each 
trial. Choice conditions were rated as significantly freer than No Choice conditions, both for trials 
where participants stayed with their initial choice and trials where participants switched their choice. 
No Choice Switch trials were rated significantly less free than No Choice Stay trials. *** p<0.001 
 
MVPA predictive choice patterns 
First, we investigated from which brain regions we could predict participants’ choices 
during each half of the corridor (Figure 3). During the period from the start of the trial to the 
halfway point, before the cues were presented, participants’ intention to choose the left or 
right door could be decoded from a cluster in the visual cortex (p<0.05 FWE-corrected), with 
an average decoding accuracy of 76% (26% above chance). Once the cues were visible, 
from the halfway point until the end of the corridor, decoding in the visual cortex remained 
significant, at an accuracy of 76% for Choice trials and 80% for No Choice trials. An 
additional cluster in the left motor cortex represented choice information at this stage at an 
accuracy of 70% for No Choice trials (p<0.05 FWE-corrected); in Choice trials, this motor 
cortex cluster represented choices with 63% accuracy and was not significant at an FWE-
corrected level (p<0.001 uncorrected). Decoding in the left motor cortex is likely to reflect 
the mapping of chosen location to motor plans (the index and middle fingers of the right 
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hand were always mapped onto the left and the right door position, respectively). At the 
same uncorrected threshold level (p<0.001), an additional cluster in the precuneus was 
found to be predictive of choice outcomes with 59% accuracy in the Choice condition only.   
We next examined patterns of activity that allowed for the decoding of the availability 
of choice options for Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay conditions. In these conditions, 
participants engaged in the same choice behaviour and stayed with their original chosen 
door, with the only difference being whether or not the alternative door remained free to 
choose after the locks appeared. We reasoned that the distinguishing difference between 
the two conditions would therefore be the availability of an alternative option. We found that 
two clusters were predictive of the availability of an option, including right middle frontal 
gyrus (MFG; peak MNI coordinates [36 35 34]), with a decoding accuracy of 63%, extending 
to the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; peak MNI coordinates [21 32 -5]), with an accuracy of 
57% (Figure 4A); (p<0.05 FWE-corrected). 
 
 
Figure 3 Whole-brain searchlight decoding revealed regions where patterns of voxel activity 
predicted a left or right choice, separated by choice condition (Choice in red and No Choice in blue) 
and trial period (left: start to halfway; right: halfway cues to door). Patterns of activity in the visual 
cortex, left motor cortex and precuneus (for Choice trials) predicted choice outcomes. Decoding 
results are displayed at an uncorrected threshold of p<0.001. 
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Relationship between decoding and free choice ratings  
Next, we investigated whether the patterns of activity in the main right MFG cluster 
or the right IFG that were predictive for the ongoing availability of choice options were also 
related to the participants’ subjective experience of free choice. We hypothesised that if 
patterns in these clusters represented the alternative door, more distinct patterns of activity 
would correspond to greater perceived freedom when both options were available in Choice 
trials, and conversely less perceived freedom in No Choice trials. We therefore correlated 
the average decoding accuracy from these clusters for each individual with their average 
free choice ratings for Choice Stay and No Choice Stay trials separately. In the right MFG, 
we found a significant positive correlation (r=0.61, p=0.002) between decoding accuracy 
and how free participants reported the Choice Stay trials to be (Figure 4B). We also found 
a significant negative correlation between decoding accuracy and the perceived freedom of 
choice in the Forced-Stay condition (r=-0.49, p=0.02; Figure 4C). We found no correlation 
between decoding accuracy in the IFG and perceived freedom in either condition (r<0.01, 
ps>0.10). These results confirm that the discriminability of patterns in the MFG was related 
to both the perception of more freedom in the Choice condition as well as of less freedom in 
the No Choice condition.  
Finally, we aimed to investigate whether greater encoding of the alternative door 
when it was available further corresponded to a higher likelihood that the participant would 
choose to freely switch doors overall. We correlated decoding accuracy in the MFG with the 
frequency of choice switches participants made. This Spearman correlation analysis 
revealed a positive significant relationship of r=0.44, p=0.04, indicating that participants with 
higher decoding accuracy in this region switched their choice more frequently. 
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Figure 4 Whole-brain searchlight decoding for availability of choice options (Choice Stay vs No 
Choice Stay) under conditions of identical choices. A) We found a significant cluster in the right 
middle frontal gyrus (decoding accuracy 63%), which extended into the right inferior frontal gyrus 
(decoding accuracy 57%). Decoding results are displayed at an uncorrected threshold of p<0.001. 
B) Pearson correlation for the average decoding accuracy (Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) with the 
perceived freedom of choice across all participants for Choice Stay trials, and C) with the perceived 
freedom of choice for No Choice Stay trials. Both correlation coefficients were significant. 
 
Discussion 
We sought to determine whether the availability of choice influences the perception 
of freedom and the neural representation of choice in voluntary decision-making. We found 
that participants’ subjective experience of freedom was dependent on the ongoing 
availability of options during decision preparation. Participants rated choices as significantly 
freer in cases where both doors remained available to select, in contrast to when the open 
door matched the participant’s choice but the alternative door was no longer available. In 
other words, simply eliminating the availability of an alternative door reduced the perceived 
freedom, even though the participant’s initial choice could still be made. Decoding the choice 
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conditions in which participants freely stayed with their initial choice or were required to stay 
by the presence of a locked door revealed that availability of choice was represented in fine-
grained patterns of activity in frontal regions in the MFG and IFG. The accuracy with which 
these conditions could be decoded from the MFG correlated with the perceived level of 
freedom individuals reported. We further found a positive correlation of decoding accuracy 
in the same region with the frequency with which participants freely switched when both 
doors were available. Together, this indicates that perceived freedom of choice may relate 
to neural activity encoding the available options in the environment.  
In order to investigate subjective freedom of choice, we asked participants to report 
how free they felt for each decision without specifying how the participants were to judge 
freedom (Filevich et al., 2013). Critically, the use of self-report allowed for a graded metric 
of free choice based on participants’ own interpretations (Callard & Fitzgerald, 2014; Filevich 
et al., 2013). We found that participants’ perceived freedom for their choices was 
significantly influenced by the availability of options. When the opportunity remained to 
select the other door, or change one’s mind, participants rated their choices as significantly 
freer than when the other door was locked. A number of studies have indicated that people 
display a preference for having choice, even when it provides no additional benefit (Bown et 
al., 2003; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Suzuki, 2000). It is often thought that this preference is 
related to a sense of agency in being able to make a choice (Leotti et al., 2010; Ryan & Deci, 
2006). In our study, participants freely chose at the start of every trial but reported greater 
freedom for trials where both doors remained open than trials where they found the 
alternative, non-chosen, door was locked. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact 
that our participants rarely chose to freely switch their decision, with some participants never 
choosing to do so. Therefore, our findings suggest that it is not simply making a choice but 
the ongoing availability of options that contributes to a sense of free choice.  
With regards to the specific left or right decision, we found that the upcoming decision 
could be decoded from neural activity in the visual cortex from the start of the corridor in all 
conditions. This most likely reflects that participants visually attended to the spatial position 
of the door that they were preparing to select throughout the trial. Following the lock cues, 
the left or right door choice could be additionally decoded from the left motor cortex (although 
only significant at a corrected level for Choice conditions), suggesting differences in motor 
preparatory activity for the right index and middle fingers, to match the left or right door, 
respectively. Thus, it appears that participants relied on visual attention initially to plan the 
upcoming choice, and only translated it into a motor plan once the options were known.  
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We further found that the availability of choice could be decoded from regions in the 
right MFG and IFG when comparing only the conditions in which participants continued with 
their initial choice. It should be noted that other factors of the choice, including the 
maintenance of their initial intention and motor preparation, were equivalent, as participants 
were able to select the door they had initially chosen in both cases. The MFG is part of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is involved in maintaining task-relevant information 
online, especially in the transition of sensory information to prospective motor plans (Curtis 
& D'Esposito, 2003). Activation of the MFG, in a similar cluster to ours, has been previously 
associated with sustained visuospatial attention during tasks requiring object information to 
be held online for an upcoming response (Babiloni et al., 2005; Curtis et al., 2004; Ricciardi 
et al., 2006). While this could be related to either spatial memory or prospective motor 
preparation, efforts to dissociate these effects have suggested that MFG activity is more 
specifically associated with spatial memory (Curtis et al., 2004). In our task, participants 
were required to keep in mind the available doors to choose as they approached their 
position in the virtual environment. Thus, the availability of one or both doors could be 
expected to differentially recruit visuospatial information storage, which may result in a 
different pattern of encoding in the MFG. 
MFG activity has also been found to increase prior to freely made attentional shifts 
between left and right visual streams (Gmeindl et al., 2016). This was proposed to reflect 
the intention to re-orient attention to the alternative option (Gmeindl et al., 2016). There are 
notable parallels between this study and our current findings, where we could decode from 
the same region under conditions when a second option was available for consideration. 
Based on our previous findings of more visual fixations to alternative options for free than 
instructed decisions (Rens et al., submitted), it is likely that participants attended more to 
the alternative door when it remained open than when it was locked. This is also in line with 
our finding of a correlation between decoding accuracy in this region and the likelihood that 
participants freely switched their choice. Even though the decoding accuracy was derived 
from conditions in which no switch occurred, one possible interpretation is that more distinct 
patterns of activity in this region reflected greater consideration of the alternative door and 
this, in turn, was linked to a higher probability of an ensuing decision to switch. Overall, our 
findings support the view that activity in this region corresponded to consideration of options 
in the environment in order to prepare an upcoming decision (Gmeindl et al., 2016). 
Remarkably, we further found that the difference in activity patterns in the MFG, 
corresponding to the availability of choice, was strongly correlated with the perceived 
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freedom of choice individuals reported. Decoding accuracy in the MFG for each participant 
correlated positively with the perceived freedom of choice when both doors were available, 
and negatively with the perceived freedom for trials in which the alternative (non-chosen) 
door was locked. This suggests that individuals who had a more distinct neural 
representation of the availability of choice, and hence possibly greater consideration of the 
alternative door, were more likely to perceive their choices as being freer and, conversely, 
more likely to perceive the absence of options as less free, even when they were still able 
to select the door that they initially chose. Alternatively, these individuals could have had a 
higher propensity for perceiving freedom of choice, which may have led to more distinct 
neural representations of the presence of choice options. Freedom of choice has often been 
linked to the availability of options through self-report measures (Banja, 2015; Catania, 
1975; Monroe & Malle, 2010), but we provide evidence that the subjective experience of free 
choice can be linked to neural representations of the availability of choice.  
It has been suggested that subjective freedom of choice relates to the degree to 
which the environment precludes alternative options, rather than strictly to the degree of 
choice (Filevich et al., 2013). We extend this to propose that perceived freedom may be 
experienced at an individual level according to how strongly individuals weigh the options 
available to them. Our interpretation aligns with that suggested by Filevich and Haggard 
(2013), whereby individuals maintain an internal model of available options in the 
environment and this contributes to a feeling of free choice. We expand on this theory by 
showing that the removal of an option, by a locked door, appeared to change the choice 
representation in a dynamic task setting, but to a different extent across individuals. Of note, 
in a previous study the reaction times for choosing between options appeared to reflect the 
initial number of options, rather than the final reduced set (Filevich & Haggard, 2013). 
However, our study provides evidence that a locked door resulted in an updated choice 
representation with a reduced level of freedom. The reason why we find evidence of an 
updated choice representation may be that participants in our study had longer to update 
(4s in comparison to up to 1.5s). Alternatively, the interactive nature of the task environment 
may have encouraged more flexible updating. These factors remain to be investigated with 
future studies.   
An outstanding question is why having multiple options would harbour a sense of 
freedom, particularly in experimental settings such as these, where there is nothing to be 
gained from selecting either of the doors. Likewise, it is perplexing that humans and other 
animals will select or even pay for the opportunity for choice when it provides no benefit 
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(Bown et al., 2003; Catania, 1975; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Ono, 2000; Suzuki, 2000). One 
theory for why choice is so highly valued is that it permits us to optimise our outcomes in 
dynamic environments, such as the real world, where having options available has an 
adaptive advantage (Klyubin et al., 2005; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). From an embodied 
perspective, the freedom of an agent strongly depends on the possibilities it perceives in the 
environment (Klyubin et al., 2005). The availability of choice may not depend solely on the 
initial options but may be continuously monitored as individuals prepare for upcoming 
decisions. Encoding of multiple available plans would enable an individual to flexibly update 
responses to environmental events or switch motor plans even after an action has been 
selected (Filevich & Haggard, 2013; Resulaj et al., 2009). Even if we are set on one choice, 
there is liberty in knowing that alternative options are still there, “just in case”.  
There are a few considerations to note in this study design. We chose to use 
naturalistic cues but, as such, the conditions for option availability were associated with 
defined visual properties (closed lock or open lock), which may have contributed to the 
decoding outcome. The absence of decoding in visual areas between conditions, in addition 
to the strong correlation in the identified ROIs with subjective reports, is not consistent with 
the interpretation that the decoding was driven by these visual differences but this factor 
cannot be ruled out. We also wanted to ensure that participants did not base their decisions 
on real or constructed differences in the value of the outcome, and that commitments to 
choices were on the basis of will, or personal ownership of the choice alone. This came with 
a limitation in that the choices had no consequence, and the participants therefore had no 
objective reason to be invested in whichever option they chose (Bode et al., 2014). This may 
be one reason why they rarely changed their minds when permitted. In order to be more 
ecological, the choices would need to have different outcomes to attain. However, the fact 
that participants perceived freedom so strongly based on not only the ability to stay with their 
initial choice but availability of options, which was further evident in differences in neural 
patterns of activity, indicates that this effect exists in the absence of value.  
In summary, we found that availability of options is represented in patterns of neural 
activity and influences the perceived freedom of choice. Our results are in accordance with 
an embodied theory of volition, in which an agent’s experience of free choice is dependent 
on the opportunities for alternate actions that they perceive in the environment. Importantly, 
our findings suggest that preference for choice is not only related to the initial options that 
allow an individual to self-initiate a preferred choice. Rather, the continued existence of 
options appears to foster a sense of freedom as individuals prepare for upcoming actions. 
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Ultimately, the positive influence on perceived freedom that choice provides may exist to 
promote adaptive behaviour in the context of a dynamic world.  
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Supplementary Data 
Individual participant responses on the post-session questionnaire, indicating on 
what basis participants judged how free their choices were. These were post hoc scored 
according to three overall categories: the ability to carry out the initial choice, the availability 
of doors, and the general feeling associated with the decision (Table S1). 
 
Table S1 Post-study questionnaire responses on judgement of free choice 
Question:	 Scoring:	 	 	
On	 what	 basis	 did	 you	 judge	 how	 free	 your	
decisions	were?	
Initial	choice	 Availability	of	
doors	
Feeling	
If	I	was	able	to	stick	to	my	decision,	it	felt	like	a	
free	 decision;	 if	 this	 was	 supported	 by	 the	
other	 door	 being	 locked,	 my	 decision	 felt	
'confirmed'	and	more	rewarding,	but	less	free	
because	 the	 other	 option	 was	 no	 longer	
available.	If	both	doors	were	unlocked,	sticking	
to	the	decision	and	changing	the	decision	felt	
equally	free	to	me,	as	my	decision	in	that	case	
felt	less	affected	by	external	influences.	
1	 1	 	
My	feelings		 	 	 1	
On	the	unlocked	doors,	if	both	were	unlocked,	
i	felt	more	free	
	 1	 	
the	extent	i	can	have	my	own	choice	 1	 	 	
i	judged	my	decision	by	whether	it	matches	my	
initial	 or	 not,	 it	 feels	 free	 when	 my	 initial	
decision	was	the	unlocked	one	
1	 	 	
based	on	is	it	my	choice	is	wrong	or	right.	 1	 	 	
If	 both	 doors	 were	 unlocked	 I	 felt	 very	 free,	
regardless	of	 if	 I	 changed	or	not.	 If	one	door	
was	unlocked	and	it	didn't	match	my	choice	I	
didn't	feel	free.	If	one	door	was	unlocked	and	
it	matched	my	choice,	 I	 felt	 less	 free	as	 time	
went	on	for	some	reason.	
	 1	 	
do	not	force	me	to	change	my	mind	to	achieve	
something	and	I	feel	comfortable.	
1	 	 	
basically	on	my	urge	of	the	right	door	 	 	 1	
If	my	initial	decision	aligned	with	the	unlocked	
door	I	felt	my	decision	was	still	free	
1	 	 	
I	 regarded	 a	 free	 decision	 to	 be	 one	 that	
matched	 my	 initial	 choice	 as	 I	 was	 not	
redirected	 against	 my	 wishes,	 however	 a	
decision	where	I	could	change	my	decision	at	
the	 end	 of	 the	 corridor	 seemed	 to	 be	 more	
free.	
1	 1	 	
If	 my	 original	 choice	 was	 the	 same	 as	 the	
unlocked	 door	 and	 if	 both	 doors	 were	
unlocked	I	considered	the	decision	to	be	free.	
1	 1	 	
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Whether	or	not,	after	the	fact,	I	felt	as	though	
I	was	being	forced	to	alter	my	decision	or	not.	
If	 I	was	not	forced	to	make	a	change	 I	 felt	as	
though	 I	 was	 more	 free	 in	 my	 decision,	
particularly	if	both	were	unlocked	allowing	me	
to	remain	with	my	choice	OR	alter.	
1	 1	 	
Whether	it	matches	my	initial	choice	and	when	
both	doors	are	unlocked		
1	 1	 	
free	to	choose	and	change	my	decisions		 1	 1	 	
based	on	the	previous	choices	they	gave	 	 	 	
Whether	the	door	I	initially	wanted	to	choose	
was	still	unlocked	
1	 	 	
whether	or	not	I	need	to	change	my	decision	
to	get	to	the	unlocked	door	
1	 	 	
When	I	came	to	the	end	if	I	could	pick	the	door	
I	chose	at	the	start	I	chose	it	to	be	very	free	
1	 	 	
Whether	 the	 door	 I	 initially	 chose	 was	
unlocked	and	whether	I	could	change	from	my	
original	decision	
1	 1	 	
General	feeling	 	 	 1	
How	I	generally	felt	at	the	time,	at	some	points	
I	was	unsure	of	the	decision	I	had	made	and	so	
decided	 that	 my	 feeling	 of	 'freeness'	 was	
decreased.		More	often	then	not	though	I	felt	
free	doing	the	task.	
	 	 1	
Whether	 a	 door	 was	 unlocked	 and	 matched	
my	original	choice	
1	 1	 	
I	I	was	allowed	to	make	my	initital	selection	 1	 	 	
	 17	 10	 4	
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Preface 
 
In the previous chapters, the focus was on understanding neural patterns of activity 
encoding free choices prior to a decision. The findings provide compelling evidence to 
suggest that not only the upcoming choice but all available options are taken into 
consideration during planning for free choices. In particular, they have highlighted the 
intimate relationship between perceived freedom and the awareness of having options 
available. This belies the critical question of why the ability to choose otherwise is so central 
to a sense of free will. In this final study, I move forward with the view of free will as a 
phenomenon arising from embodiment and directly test the hypothesis that an active 
inference model can predict free choice behaviour. I develop a task that allows participants 
to freely navigate to preferred contexts, which are differentiated according to both reward 
and the number of options (entropy) available. Using computational modelling, I aim to 
determine whether choices are best predicted by active inference and, hence, if the desire 
for having options may be explained as a means of entropy maximisation.   
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Chapter 4.  
Active inference and maximising choice in free choice 
behaviour 
Rens, N., Schwartenbeck, P., Pezzulo, G., Cunnington, R. 
 
Abstract 
Preference for choice is central to our belief in free will and translates behaviourally 
to a bias towards greater choice availability. Choice bias has been difficult to explain with 
traditional economic models of decision-making, which factor in only the utilitarian value of 
a choice. Recent active inference models that additionally account for an agent’s desire to 
maximise the amount of information available (entropy), and thereby minimise uncertainty 
for future, offer an alternative approach to more accurately predict choice behaviour. In this 
study, participants freely navigated a virtual environment consisting of two consecutive 
choices leading to reward locations in separate rooms. Critically, the choice of one room 
always led to two final doors while, in the second room, only one door was permissible to 
choose. This design allowed us to separately determine the influence of value and entropy 
on participants’ choice behaviour. We found that choice behaviour is better predicted by an 
active inference model than expected utility alone, and both the availability of options and 
the value of the context positively influenced perceived freedom of choice. In summary, 
these results show that free choice behaviour is well-explained by a model in which both 
utility and availability of options are optimised. In other words, participants preferentially 
select courses of actions that result in more future options, thus increasing their ability to 
choose in the future, independent of the value of such options. 
 	
 79 
Introduction 
In both philosophical and layperson considerations of free will, a central theme is the 
availability of options or the ‘ability to do otherwise’ (Banja, 2015; Roskies, 2010; Stillman et 
al., 2011). Decisions are regarded, and reportedly experienced, as free only when an 
individual has the opportunity to take an alternative course of action. Accordingly, a number 
of behavioural studies have reported a choice bias, in which individuals preferentially select 
options that provide more choice (Bown et al., 2003; Cockburn et al., 2014; Fujiwara et al., 
2013; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Ono, 2000). Choice preference has commonly been related 
to theories of self-determinism, which propose that the ability to choose promotes a sense 
of control over the environment (Leotti et al., 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, as choice 
provides no utility of its own, this behaviour has been difficult to reconcile within traditional 
economic decision models that depend principally on the utility of outcomes (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Nash Jr, 1950). Recent belief-based decision models based on active 
inference that take into account environmental information may better account for the 
perceived value of choice (Friston et al., 2017; Friston et al., 2015; Schwartenbeck  et al., 
2015).  
It has been commonly reported that, when faced with one option that leads to a set 
action to receive an outcome or a second option that leads to a subsequent choice, humans, 
and other species, preferentially choose the option that provides further choice (Bown et al., 
2003; Catania, 1975; Fujiwara et al., 2013; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Ono, 2000; Suzuki, 
1997, 1999). Individuals are also more likely to choose an item when offered with an 
alternative than when the same item is offered alone (Bown et al., 2003). These effects are 
evident even when there is no benefit to be gained from the ability to choose. In some cases, 
individuals will even sacrifice potential reward in exchange for information about choice 
options, despite not having the ability to change the outcomes (Bennett et al., 2016). This 
has led to the suggestion that choice may provide inherent value, potentially serving to 
encourage an agent to exercise control over the environment (Inesi et al., 2011; Leotti & 
Delgado, 2011; Leotti et al., 2010).  
Others have referred to this paradoxical choice preference as an “over-valuation” of 
choice, in recognition of the fact that seeking options does not necessarily result in the best 
outcome (Fujiwara et al., 2013). Accordingly, the role that choice plays in driving decisions 
has been difficult to account for with traditional economic decision models, which consider 
decisions on the basis of expected utility alone (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nash Jr, 1950). 
In economic theory, the value of choice is regarded as increasing the likelihood of attaining 
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a preferred item, with larger option sets increasing the likelihood that a preferred item will be 
available (Pattanaik & Xu, 1998). However, it does not account for an inherent preference 
for choice when it does not affect the value of the outcome attained. A model based on 
active inference, in which agents act according to beliefs about the most likely states in the 
world, may better account for choice behaviour (Friston et al., 2015; Schwartenbeck  et al., 
2015).  
Active inference posits that the brain uses a process of Bayesian estimation in order 
to optimally infer future states and the best course of action (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 
2017; Friston et al., 2015). Action selection is described as a free energy minimisation 
process, where free energy includes two factors: a pragmatic, goal-seeking part (extrinsic 
value) and an information seeking, utility-reducing part (intrinsic value). It can be noted that, 
in this context, the drive is not to minimise uncertainty over time, as in exploratory behaviour, 
but to minimise the surprise experienced in a future state by maximising the number of 
expected possibilities (Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). This can 
be thought of as “keeping one’s options open” (Klyubin et al., 2008). Thus, this model frames 
choice in a different perspective, by assuming that agents are driven to maximise options 
as a mechanism of best accounting for uncertainty of possible outcome states (Friston et 
al., 2017; Friston et al., 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2015). 
Importantly, expected utility and active inference models make divergent predictions 
about choice, as only active inference takes into account the distribution of outcome states, 
and factors in the positive influence from states that do not directly affect outcome values. 
Schwartenbeck  et al. (2015) demonstrated that an active inference model could better 
predict participants’ preference for choice sets with a higher number of items than a model 
based on expected utility alone. Choices in the task resulted only in one outcome on 
completion of the task, taken at random from a selected trial set, hence entropy 
maximisation did not consequentially affect the outcomes attained. However, this study 
demonstrated the potential to account for choice bias as entropy gain, by showing that 
choice behaviour could be predicted as a means of maximising the number of options kept 
available. Framing choice preference in an active inference framework would provide a 
theoretical explanation for findings that have been difficult to justify with economic theory 
and, further, provide a formal model to interpret free choice behaviour.  
In order to investigate whether an active inference scheme could predict participants’ 
preference for contexts providing higher entropy, we designed a choice task in a virtual 
environment where participants freely navigated through two consecutive rooms to find 
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rewards. Importantly, choosing one room led to two doors that were always open while, in 
the second room, one of the doors was always locked. The location of the locked door in 
the second room changed on every trial, ensuring that participants could choose between 
four different outcomes overall but that one room was always associated with more options 
(higher entropy) than the other. By manipulating the relative values of reward outcomes 
between the two rooms, we were able to determine the relative influence of value and 
entropy on participants’ choice behaviour. We hypothesised that choice behaviour would be 
better explained by an active inference model than a classical expected utility model, 
predicting a bias towards the room providing more choice. We further predicted that both 
these factors (utility and entropy) would influence participants’ perceived sense of freedom. 
Finally, we examined both the complexity and variability of motion trajectories in the virtual 
environment in order to determine if the availability of choice would influence the ongoing 
decision-making process. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-eight participants were recruited from the University of Queensland after 
providing written informed consent. All participants were right-handed, had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and no history of psychiatric disease, neurological trauma or 
disorder. One participant was excluded for failing to properly follow task instructions, and 
data from the remaining 27 participants were used for the behavioural analyses (23 female, 
mean age 21 years, range 18-24 years). Participants were monetarily compensated for their 
time. The University of Queensland Medical Research Ethics Committee approved the 
experiment. 
 
Experimental task 
The task was based in a virtual environment, presented using Psychtoolbox on 
MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA). Participants viewed a first-person perspective 
from their current position in a three-dimensional environment, which updated continuously 
as they moved. The paradigm is shown in Figure 1. Participants received instructions and 
underwent a brief training period to practise navigating in the task environment prior to 
commencing the experimental task. Participants were asked to make decisions between two 
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sets of doors in order to reach the location of gems they would like to collect. To navigate 
the environment, participants held down the up-arrow key to move forward and the left and 
right arrow keys to turn in each direction. When a door was reached, it could be opened by 
pressing the space bar. Choosing the left or right door in the first room would determine the 
subsequent room, and choosing left or right in the second room would open the door to 
receive the gem at that location.  
Critically, participants were informed that a final door could be locked, in which case 
it was unavailable to choose and only the unlocked door could be selected. Selecting this 
door resulted in an error (a skull cue) and no points were gained. In each block, one of the 
final rooms always had one locked door. The location of this room remained constant 
throughout each block but the specific locked door (left or right) changed pseudo-randomly 
on each trial. This meant that participants learnt that, in the first room, one door always led 
to a room that had both doors available (2-Choice), whereas the other door always led to a 
room that had only one door available (1-Choice). Importantly, this design ensured that four 
final locations were available throughout the block, such that if participants attempted to 
equally sample each location the probability of choosing each of the two final rooms would 
be 0.5 (2/4). 
A gem, worth a certain number of points, was gained after selection of any available 
door and presented for 1s. Within each room, the mean value of the gems behind both doors 
was equivalent, but the actual number of points received each trial varied according to a set 
variance of 2 points. Critically, however, the relative values of the gems between the two 
rooms was varied between blocks according to five conditions. In the first condition, the 
values of gems in each room was equal (M=6 points). This condition permitted us to test if 
there was any choice bias present for each participant when values of rewards were equal 
across all doors. If the availability of choice was a factor in participants’ choices, we would 
expect the choice proportion for the 2-Choice room to be greater than 0.5, whereas equal 
probability would indicate choices were not influenced by the number of options. In two 
conditions, the value of gems in the 2-Choice room was either greater (M=8 points) or much 
greater (M=10 points) than the value of the gems in the 1-Choice room (M=6 points). In the 
remaining two conditions, the reverse was true. This factorial design enabled us to 
investigate the combined effects of option availability and value on choice behaviour. Two 
blocks of each of the five conditions were presented, counter-balanced for door position, 
and each block consisted of 40 trials, giving 80 trials in total for each condition. 
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Following each block, participants provided a rating of their perceived level of freedom for 
the left and right rooms on a free-sliding visual analogue scale from ‘Not free’ (0) to ‘Very 
free’ (10) (Filevich et al., 2013). Participants were instructed to give this rating according to 
their own interpretation of “free”. The room positions were counterbalanced in order to 
circumvent stereotypical and automated responding, but allowed us to determine the 
perceived freedom for each room.  
 
Figure 1 Experimental paradigm design. Participants were instructed to navigate the virtual maze 
environment in order to reach the gem that they wished to choose. Left panel shows the decision 
tree for a single trial. Participants first chose between two doors leading to two separate rooms. In 
one room, both doors were always available (2-Choice), whereas in the second room one of the 
doors (randomly left or right) was always locked (1-Choice). The value of the gems was 
manipulated so that the two rooms were either equivalent in value or one was comparatively more 
valuable than the other. Right panel shows the participant perspective for the doors in each of the 
rooms, noting that the only difference is the presence of a barricade across the left door in the 1-
Choice room on the right-hand side.  
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Behavioural analysis  
We calculated choice bias by the proportion of trials the 2-Choice room was selected 
over the 1-Choice room. We performed a one-sample t-test to determine if the bias was 
significantly different from 0.5 for the baseline condition (2C=1C) and also overall. We then 
carried out a linear regression analysis to ascertain to what extent individual participant 
choices were predicted by both expected utility and entropy. For each trial, we input the 
difference in entropy between the 1-Choice and 2-Choice rooms, determined as: 
 𝐻 =	 𝑃 𝑖 . log	(𝑃 𝑖 )RSTTUVWAH        (1) 
 
This was constant on every trial, as there were always two doors available in the 2-Choice 
room and one door in the 1-Choice room. Utility was calculated as the average comparative 
reward value of the gems in the 2-Choice room, which changed in each condition according 
to the respective points, for example +2 in the 2C>1C condition and -2 in the 1C>2C 
condition. The dependent variable was choice response, which we coded as +1 for the 2-
Choice room and -1 for the 1-Choice room on each trial. A positive coefficient would indicate 
a positive influence of each factor, whereas a negative coefficient would signify avoidance. 
We assessed group-level significance with one-sample t-tests for utility and entropy gain.  
Subjective reports of perceived freedom of choice for each room were analysed with 
a 2x5 repeated measures ANOVA, including factors of Choice Availability (1-Choice or 2-
Choice rooms) and Value, separated by the five conditions from the lowest to highest 
comparative value for each room. For Value, Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated (p<0.001), so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied. 
 
Model specification  
We created a computational model of the task environment in order to compare 
predictions for models based on expected utility or active inference (Kullback-Leibler-
control). This model is built on a computational framework that formulates Markov Decision 
Processes as active Bayesian inference (Friston et al., 2017; Friston et al., 2015), framing 
decision-making as probabilistic inference (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012). Active inference is 
built on the premise that an agent builds a generative model of its decision context, which 
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creates a probabilistic mapping from the underlying hidden states to the outcomes that are 
observed. This mapping is updated using variational Bayes, described in detail in Friston et 
al. (2017). The assumption is that agents perform inference on the current state, policies, 
and precision of beliefs in order to plan upcoming choices. Policies are the possible action 
sequences an agent can take and precision reflects confidence in the policy selection, which 
uses a Bayes optimal solution that is inferred at every time-step in the trial. Precision is a 
parameter that controls the stochasticity of action selection (Friston et al., 2017). 
The generative model is specified by A, B, C and d matrices (Figure 2). The A matrix 
represents an agent’s observations and provides the mappings from hidden states s to 
observations o at each transition t, 𝑃(𝑜X|𝑠X). In this simplified version of the task, there are 
only four hidden states and each are uniquely associated with an outcome. The maze has 
a starting location, two states corresponding to two available reward locations possible in 
the 2-Choice room and one state corresponding to the single available reward location in 
the 1-Choice room. The B matrix denotes the transition probabilities based on the current 
hidden state and the action taken a, 𝑃(𝑠XZH|𝑠X, 𝑎X). In this case, the agent makes only the 
first action to choose left or right, leading to the 2-Choice or 1-Choice room, respectively. 
The left policy had a 50% likelihood of the agent reaching either one of the two possible 
reward locations, whereas the right policy led deterministically to the one available reward. 
The c and d vectors correspond to an agent’s prior beliefs about observations and initial 
states, respectively. We specified a c-vector for every condition, to account for the changing 
reward value of the gems (2, 3, or 4 equivalent to 6, 8, or 10 points). 
We simulated agent behaviour according to either expected utility (equation 2) or an 
active inference scheme, which maximises both expected utility and entropy (equation 3).  	 𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑃 𝑆\ 𝑆X, 𝜋^_ . 𝑢(𝑆\|𝑚)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2) 
	−𝐷cd[𝑃(𝑆\|𝑆X, 𝜋) ∥ 𝑃(𝑆\ 𝑚 = 𝐻 𝑃 𝑆\ 𝑆X, 𝜋 + 𝑃 𝑆\ 𝑆X, 𝜋^_ . 𝑢(𝑆\|𝑚)	 (3)	
 
Essentially, the active inference model incorporates an additional factor of entropy over the 
outcomes. This equates to minimising the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the prior 
beliefs on outcomes and the posterior outcome attained. Predictions from each of these 
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models were then used to compare to participant choice behaviour in order to determine the 
respective model evidence.  
We performed model inversion, based on variational Bayes, using the 
spm_dcm_mdp.m function within the DEM toolbox (SPM12, Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, London, UK) (Schwartenbeck & Friston, 2016). Participant choices were 
coded as a Markov decision process, in which states corresponded to the left or right doors 
Figure 2 Generative model specification. The A matrix provides the mappings from hidden states 
to observations. In this model, there were only four states possible and each mapped to a unique 
outcome. The first state corresponds to the starting point, states 2 and 3 represent the reward 
locations possible in the 2-Choice room and state 4 is the single reward location in the 1-Choice 
room. The B matrix defines the transition probabilities. The agent could choose left or right to select 
the 2-Choice or 1-Choice room, respectively. Choosing left led to a 50% probability of reaching 
either one of the two reward locations. Choosing right led deterministically to the single reward 
location. The c-vector was specified for each condition to represent a prior on the reward value of 
the gems available in each room. The d vector denotes the prior belief of the initial state. 
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chosen in the 2-Choice room and the door chosen (regardless of location) in the 1-Choice 
room. Actions corresponded to choosing the 2-Choice (“left”) room or 1-Choice (“right”) 
room. Individual parameters were calculated with maximum a-posteriori estimation. As each 
condition was modelled with a separate c-vector, specifying changes in final reward states, 
we attained a separate 𝛽 and free energy estimate for each condition for each participant. 
After model inversion, we compared all free energies, an approximation to model evidence, 
for each participant using Bayesian model comparison to determine whether participant 
behaviour was better predicted by expected utility or active inference (Rigoux et al., 2014; 
Stephan et al., 2009).  
 
Decision trajectory analysis 
The Cartesian (x,y) coordinates of the participant’s position in virtual space were 
measured with every screen refresh (60 Hz) in order to determine the trajectories of 
participants’ movement towards the doors for each decision. Approximately 2s of data were 
collected for each room, according to the individual response time and trajectory. We first 
aimed to analyse the complexity of the trajectories in each of the final rooms (2-Choice and 
1-Choice rooms). To do so, we calculated the number of reversals in direction that occurred 
along the x-axis in the trajectory, termed ‘x-flips’ (Dale et al., 2008). Complexity in motion 
trajectories is thought to arise due to competing evidence, or uncertainty, in the underlying 
decision plan (McKinstry et al., 2008). If the presence of an alternative door, in the 2-Choice 
room, remained actively considered then we expected we would find greater fluctuations in 
these decision trajectories than for trajectories in the 1-Choice room.  
We also measured a second, related, factor of decision variability using the discrete 
Fréchet distance (equation 4). This function measures the similarity between two curved 
trajectories to find the minimum distance that connects each line (Eiter & Mannila, 1994; 
Fréchet, 1906).  
  𝐷hUijkiX 𝐴, 𝐵 = inf	maxr,s∈u	X∈[v,H] 			 ∥ A(α(t), B	β t ∥I       (4) 
 
 
This is commonly referred to as the “walking-dog distance”, as it can be understood as the 
minimum length of leash that would be required for a man walking his dog if each were on 
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the separate paths (Eiter & Mannila, 1994). We first time-normalised each trial to 101 time-
points and excluded x-flip trials, as these would lead to abnormally large peaks in distance. 
We calculated an average trajectory for each participant, in each condition and room, and 
then, on each trial, calculated the discrete Fréchet distance between the trial trajectory and 
the average trajectory for the context. We expected that decision deliberation introduced by 
ongoing availability of options would result in greater variability in decision trajectories in the 
2-Choice room than the 1-Choice room. Group differences in both x-flips and Fréchet 
distance were determined using a 2x5 ANOVA of Room and Condition to compare 
measures in the 2-Choice and 1-Choice rooms across the five conditions.  
 
Results 
Participant choice behaviour 
 We first analysed choice proportions in favour of the 2-Choice room over the 1-Choice 
room. If there was no influence of option availability and participants equally chose each of 
the two rooms, choice proportions would be 0.5 when the two rooms were equally valuable. 
If participants exhibited a choice bias, the proportion would be >0.5. In the baseline 
condition, when all rewards were equal, we found that participants showed a highly 
significant choice bias, selecting the 2-Choice room on 59% (SE=2%) of trials on average 
(single-sample t-test difference from 50%: t(26)=3.909, p<0.001). This bias was further 
evident when all conditions were analysed collectively, resulting in an overall choice bias of 
58% (SE=1%; t(26)=6.028, p<0.001). This is apparent in the positive shift in choice 
proportions above the chance (50%) line towards the 2-Choice room, shown in Figure 3A. 
To further examine the contributions of utility and entropy to each participant’s choice 
behaviour, we performed a linear regression analysis to predict participant’s choices on each 
trial on the basis of comparative value and difference in entropy. We found that both 
expected utility and entropy were significant factors influencing choice behaviour (expected 
utility: mean β=0.10, SE=0.02, t(26)=6.070, p<0.001; entropy gain mean β=0.22, SE=0.04, 
t(26)=6.028, p<0.001). Individual beta coefficients for each participant are displayed in 
Figure 3B. Positive coefficients in the regression models indicated that participant choice 
behaviour was positively driven by utility and entropy-seeking factors. Finally, we asked 
whether the drive for entropy gain led to a detriment in the reward gained by each participant. 
We correlated the β coefficient for entropy gain for each participant with the total reward 
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gained in the task and found no relationship (R=-0.04, p=0.8), hence entropy maximisation 
was not associated with a detriment in utilitarian gain 
. 
Model-based predictions 
We simulated a simplified Markov decision process model of the task environment in 
order to estimate expected behaviour according to a framework based on expected utility or 
active inference, which additionally incorporated entropy maximisation. We simulated only 
Figure 3 Participant choice behaviour: A) Box-and-whisker plots show distributions of participant 
choice biases for each condition. Participants	showed	a	significant	choice	bias,	evidenced	by	a	greater	
proportion	of	choices	for	the	2-Choice	room	than	the	1-Choice	room.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	choice	
bias	was	present	across	all	conditions,	as	seen	by	the	positive	shift	in	choice	proportions.	B)	Individual	linear	
regression	coefficients	for	the	degree	to	which	each	participant’s	choices	were	predicted	by	both	utility	gain	
and	 entropy	 gain,	 sorted	 in	 ascending	 order.	 Positive	 coefficients	 indicate	 utility-	 and	 entropy-seeking	
behaviour,	whereas	negative	coefficients	indicate	avoidance.	Participants	varied	in	the	extent	but,	overall,	
showed	a	positive	tendency	for	both	factors. 
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the first action of selecting between each of the rooms, for which choosing the 2-Choice 
room gave a 50% likelihood of reaching each of two final outcomes, and the 1-Choice room 
led to one deterministic outcome. Active inference makes predictions about choices that 
contrast to those predicted on the basis of expected utility maximisation alone, particularly 
when the value of two contexts is equal. Specifically, choice behaviour predicted by this 
model showed no bias towards either room with expected utility, but a predicted probability 
of 58% for the 2-Choice room (choosing the left policy) in the active inference model. This 
was a very close match to the average choice bias of 59% exhibited by participants in our 
study. Thus, the active inference model accounts well for the bias towards choice observed 
in our participants in this paradigm.  
Next, we performed model inversion of the participant choice responses according to 
models of expected utility and active inference. Bayesian model comparison provided strong 
evidence to support an active inference model of free choice behaviour. We attained an 
exceedance probability φ = 1.0 in favour of an active inference model or, applying a 
conservative correction, protected exceedance probability φ = 0.678 (Figure 4). Hence, 
there was a very high likelihood that active inference better accounted for participant 
behaviour than expected utility alone. 
 
Figure 4 Random effects Bayesian model comparison provide evidence for an active inference 
model over expected utility alone. The exceedance probability for the active inference model 
was 1.0 (protected exceedance probability 0.678; darker red) 
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Subjective free choice ratings 
Average ratings of perceived freedom of choice differed significantly across 
conditions (Figure 5). A 2x5 repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Choice 
Availability, in which choices made in the 2-Choice room were perceived as freer than those 
in the 1-Choice room (2-Choice: M=6.9, SE=0.3, 1-Choice: M=5.4, SE=0.4; F(1,26)=10.843, 
p=0.003). There was also a main effect of Value, indicating that the reward available in each 
room had a positive influence on perceived freedom (F(1.874,48.722)=5.224, p=0.01). 
There were no significant interactions. Note that for the statistical analysis, conditions were 
ordered according to increasing value of reward. Therefore, in Figure 5, the main effect of 
Value is apparent as increasing free ratings to the right across conditions for the 2-Choice 
room (i.e. as the relative value of the 2-Choice room increased) and, conversely, increasing 
free ratings to the left across conditions for the 1-Choice room (i.e. as the relative value of 
the 1-Choice room increased). 
 
Figure 5 Free ratings given by participants for each room and condition. Free ratings were 
reported at the end of each block, from 0 (Not Free) to 10 (Very Free). Conditions are indicated 
by comparative value of the rewards. Choices made in the 2-Choice room were perceived as 
significantly freer than choices made in the 1-Choice room, where one door was always locked. 
Gem value also positively influenced perceived freedom, so that choices in each of the rooms 
were rated significantly more highly as the comparative value of gems in the room increased. 
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Decision trajectory metrics 
We first aimed to analyse the complexity of the decision trajectories using a measure, 
x-flips, that has previously been reported to indicate fluctuations in motion trajectories (Dale 
et al., 2008). We found, in our case, that fluctuations at a local level were minor but that this 
measure detected gross changes in the course of decisions (Figure 6). A 2x5 ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of Room, with flips significantly more common in the 1-Choice room 
(M=6.1%, S.E.=0.9) than the 2-Choice room (M=1.0%, S.E.=0.2; F(1,26)=30.772, p<0.001). 
There was no significant effect of Condition and no significant interaction. Participants were, 
thus, more likely to change their intended course of action in the room with the locked door 
and this was independent of the relative reward value between the two rooms.  
We next analysed the variability in participant trajectories, using the discrete Fréchet 
distance to measure the average deviation from the mean trajectory in each context (Figure 
Figure 6 Decision x-flips indicate changes of decision. A) Decision trajectories for a representative 
participant are displayed with regular trials in black and x-flips in red for the 2-Choice (left) and 1-
Choice (right) rooms. B) x-flips occurred significantly more frequently in the 1-Choice room than 
the 2-Choice room across all conditions. 
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7). A 2x5 ANOVA showed a main effect of Room, whereby there was significantly greater 
variability in the 2-Choice room (M=0.44, S.E.=0.01) than the 1-Choice room (M=0.41, 
S.E.=0.02; F(1,26)=7.578, p=0.01). We also found a main effect of Condition 
(F(4,104)=2.738, p=0.03), with the greatest path variability in the baseline condition (2C=1C) 
and the condition in which rewards in the 1-Choice room were moderately more valuable 
(1C>2C). These are the two conditions in which choices were most equal across the two 
rooms (as displayed in Figure 3). Importantly, there were no significant interactions. Path 
variability, indicative of choice deliberation, was therefore greater when a second door 
remained available. 
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Figure 7 Heat maps showing the common trajectories for the 2-Choice and 1-Choice rooms in 
each condition. Colour represents the likelihood that each point in coordinate space was crossed 
on any given trial, giving a visual representation of decision variability. Paths are significantly 
more variable, based on average Fréchet distances, in the 2-Choice room than the 1-Choice 
room, which could indicate greater choice deliberation. 
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Discussion 
We examined free choice behaviour in the context of a forward-planning task in which 
participants navigated through virtual rooms in order to reach reward locations. We found 
that participants were biased towards choosing states that provide more choice, even when 
both states were balanced in the total number of goal locations. This bias was not only 
evident when both contexts were equally valuable but throughout all value conditions, 
effectively acting as a choice (or entropy) bonus. Accordingly, we found that participant 
choices were positively predicted by both utility and entropy, which is in keeping with the 
active inference framework that jointly considers both factors. Thus, most importantly, we 
clearly showed that an active inference model, accounting for both utility and entropy, better 
accounted for choice behaviour than a model of expected utility alone. Both the availability 
of choice and the value of reward also both significantly influenced participants’ perceived 
freedom of choice. Finally, the dynamics of participants’ path trajectories, leading to door-
choice decisions, provide strong evidence that participants forward-planned their choices 
from the start of each trial but that consideration of the alternative choice may have been 
ongoing, leading to more variable path trajectories. 
Choice bias has classically been reported using a choice preference task, in which 
subjects choose between one action that leads directly to an outcome or an action that 
provides further choice (Catania, 1975; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Ono, 2000; Suzuki, 1997, 
1999). These studies have typically reported a bias of approximately two-thirds. We first 
wanted to ensure that this outcome was not the result of participants equally sampling each 
of the three possible goal locations over time, and that participants demonstrated a true 
preference for contexts providing choice. To address this, our task was designed with four 
outcome states available overall but with the difference in number of available options 
conserved on each trial, specifically two options versus one. If the choice bias previously 
reported was driven only by equal selection of each outcome state, the proportion of choices 
for the 2-Choice room would be 0.5 (2/4) whereas preference for choice would result in a 
positive bias. We found that choice was preferred not only when there was equivalence 
between choice contexts but across all conditions, as evident in the shift towards choosing 
the room with both doors available. Thus, we found similar bias to previous studies even 
when accounting for differences in the number of goal outcomes, which provides strong 
reinforcement for the observation that subjects seek contexts that provide choice. 
Preference for choice options has previously been reported in terms of value, namely 
with suggestions that choice adds intrinsic value to the valuation of a particular option 
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(Fujiwara et al., 2013; Leotti & Delgado, 2011). Active inference frames choice in a different 
perspective, by assuming that agents are driven to maximise options as a mechanism of 
best accounting for uncertainty of possible outcome states (Friston et al., 2017; Friston et 
al., 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2015). Comparing these models in our forward-planning task, we 
found that participants’ choice behaviour was better described by an active inference 
scheme than expected utility alone. This is further supported by the finding that choices 
could be predicted on the basis of both utility and entropy as driving factors. Strikingly, the 
choice bias predicted by the active inference model of the task almost exactly matched the 
observed participant bias. It has previously been demonstrated that participants’ choice 
behaviour can be explained more accurately according to active inference than expected 
utility theory in a task in which individuals showed a preference for choosing higher numbers 
of items (Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). This preference existed even when, in some cases, 
choosing the smaller set would have led to an increased likelihood of attaining the most 
valuable item. Similarly, we observed a choice bias in participants that was contrary to 
expected utility theory, whereby participants disproportionately selected the room with two 
doors even in conditions when the gems in this location were of lower value. Therefore, 
entropy factored strongly into the decision-making process and could account for choice 
behaviour in situations where economic theory failed to explain observations. Together, 
these findings offer a novel framework to account for choice preference by suggesting that 
this behaviour may be the result of a drive to maximise entropy. 
Our study further extends on behavioural evidence for active inference by showing 
that participants actively planned to be in states of higher entropy, even when those states 
knowingly led to the same value of outcome. Hence, the observed preference for routes with 
a greater number of options served only to maintain the options accessible during proactive 
preparation for the upcoming choices. Similar to other desires such as thirst and hunger, 
preference for choice has been proposed to exist as an inherent drive that motivates an 
agent to seek optimal states in the environment (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Leotti et al., 2010). 
This is particularly crucial in the context of the real-world environment, where the availability 
of options changes over time (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Klyubin et al., 2005), and choosing 
contexts that provide greater options would enhance the adaptive control an agent maintains 
over future outcomes (Klyubin et al., 2005; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Rick & Loewenstein, 
2008; Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). Maximising entropy may also function as a heuristic 
mechanism of optimising decision-making without requiring laborious, and often unfeasible, 
assessment of the value of all available actions (Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015; Volz & 
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Gigerenzer, 2012). Delaying commitment to a particular outcome may also allow an 
individual greater time to accrue evidence, particular in dynamic contexts (Bown et al., 2003; 
Lepora & Pezzulo, 2015; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Weld, 1994). Thus, we would expect 
that being in states of higher entropy would also be associated with more adaptive action 
planning in the environment. 
Our investigation of the dynamics of decisions as participants navigated the virtual 
environment confirmed that participants flexibly planned their decisions. We found that 
participants were overwhelmingly more likely to exhibit changes in their decision course in 
the room with the locked door. The most likely explanation for this is that, on some trials, 
participants already held an intention for the final door they would choose prior to entering 
the second room, which meant that they then had to change course upon discovering that 
their chosen door was locked. Had participants waited to enter the second room before 
choosing left or right again, making two independent sequential choices, it would be unclear 
why their course of action would change. Alternatively, participants either did not readily 
perceive which door was locked or did not pay attention to the orientation of the rooms. 
However, this is not implied by other findings such as the choice bias. Decision models that 
are built on reinforcement learning or active inference propose that participants rely on 
forward-planning (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2017; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 
2012; Pezzulo et al., 2014; Simon & Daw, 2011) but it has been challenging to investigate 
behaviourally. These findings provide evidence to support the idea that participants planned 
for the final goal location in advance.  
Interestingly, a number of changes in decision, albeit uncommon, were also recorded 
in the other room contexts with two doors available. Changes of mind are well-documented 
in previous motion-tracking studies (Barca & Pezzulo, 2015; McKinstry et al., 2008; Resulaj 
et al., 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2006), but it should be noted here that participants had no 
external information belying the decision outcome to rely on. Objectively, there was also no 
difference in the reward that could be gained from either door in the dual choice room. 
Therefore, these flips are indicative of changes in intention that may be driven solely by 
fluctuations in internal planning, potentially reflecting competing valuation of the options. 
Path trajectories, leading up to door-decision choices, were also more variable in the context 
of the 2-Choice room, which we interpret as indicating ongoing choice consideration. 
Embodied theories propose that all available action plans are proactively primed, permitting 
an agent to act adaptively in the environment even before full evidence towards one action 
is acquired (Cisek, 2007). It has also previously been suggested, on the basis of neural 
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evidence accumulation, that a hallmark of free decisions is their flexibility of preparation 
(Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). Our previous studies have further shown 
that, while free choices can be predicted from neural activity, neural encoding of options and 
visual attention both indicate that alternative options remain online during free choice 
preparation (Rens et al., submitted). We posit that a similar mechanism may have 
underscored behaviour in the virtual environment, in that participants planned for one goal 
location but maintained a malleable state of decision preparation during which switching to 
the alternative option remained possible.  
Ultimately, our intention in giving participants freedom to navigate the environment 
was to investigate free choice behaviour without explicitly defining free or instructed 
conditions. In line with our predictions, participants reported feeling freer in their choices 
made in the context with both doors available than where no alternative existed. This is in 
accordance with previous findings suggesting that the subjective experience of free choice 
corresponds to the availability of an alternative option (Rens et al., submitted) or the 
perception of having a higher number of options available (Filevich et al., 2013). Availability 
of choice is also a central theme in popular views of free will (Banja, 2015; Monroe & Malle, 
2010). Contrary to popular intuition, however, we also found that comparative reward value 
positively influenced perceived freedom. Libertarian views of free will emphasise the ability 
to choose any available option and, therefore, regard reward as a constraint on the freedom 
an individual has to choose (Schultz, 2015). However, layperson reports have previously 
indicated that individuals associate reward with a higher degree of free choice (Lau et al., 
2015; Lau & Wenzel, 2015) and our current findings further support this by showing a 
positive relationship between the value of decision outcomes and subjective freedom. The 
positive contribution of both factors underlying active inference to perceived freedom lends 
weight to the argument that the experience of free will may have evolved as a mechanism 
of promoting adaptive behaviour (Banja, 2015).  
There are a few considerations to take into account in this study. The design of this 
task was such that we could ensure four goal locations were possible for participants to 
choose. This was important to verify that any choice bias reported was not the result of equal 
outcome sampling. Our participant’s behaviour suggests that they did plan ahead for each 
of the final doors but, as a result, appear to have been forced to occasionally change 
decisions when a door was locked. This scenario is not quite equivalent to a single option 
existing, as a locked door could arguably be perceived as an external constraint to a planned 
choice. While free ratings did not indicate that there was a lack of perceived freedom 
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associated with this room, participants nonetheless exhibited relatively frequent changes in 
the course of their decisions. This also made comparison of trajectories in these conditions 
difficult. Second, the model we built is a simplified version of the task environment, which 
factors in the vital information of choice availability but does not take into account either 
learning or the changing states that existed in the real task. This model could be further 
optimised to more fully account for decision behaviour.   
In summary, we find evidence in favour of an active inference formulation of free 
choice behaviour, which predicts individuals are driven to maximise entropy in addition to 
utility. Findings of choice preference have previously been difficult to reconcile with 
economic theory, but the present results provide a novel perspective accounting for choice 
bias as entropy gain within a view of cognition as active inference. Further, they provide 
behavioural support for a view of voluntary decision-making as a proactive process of 
Bayesian inference. Together, our results from behavioural, physical, and subjective 
measures emphasise the central role choice plays in free decisions and contribute to a 
theory of free choice behaviour as optimal decision-making in a dynamic world.  
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Chapter 5.  
General Discussion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the neural and behavioural dynamics 
underlying voluntary decision-making from an ecological perspective. Specifically, I aimed 
to examine the way in which availability of options is factored into the voluntary decision-
making process, with a focus on the proactive decision period. This thesis presents novel 
findings to suggest that free decisions are associated with the ongoing consideration of 
available options.  
Using a novel decision-making task in a virtual environment, in Chapter 2 I found that 
free decisions were associated with a proactive decision period with engagement of 
frontoparietal and salience networks, which are thought to mediate choice selection. Further, 
intentions for an upcoming decision could be decoded from visual and motor cortices. 
However, lower pattern discrimination was found for free decisions, and combined with our 
observation of increased eye fixations to alternative options, this suggests that the choice 
selection process was flexible. Hence, while plans for instructed decisions were set from the 
time of instruction, free decisions possibly continued in a malleable state of decision 
preparation. In Chapter 3, I found that the subjective experience of free choice was strongly 
influenced by the ongoing availability of options. This influenced participants’ perceptions of 
freedom even when participants were able to choose the door they had originally selected, 
indicating that the state of having options was influential in and of itself. The presence of an 
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alternative option was represented in fine-grained patterns of activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and, most strikingly, correlated with the perceived freedom that 
participants reported. In Chapter 4, I showed that free choice behaviour in a forward-
planning task was predicted by an active inference model, whereby individuals were driven 
to maximise both the value (reward) and entropy (number of options available). These same 
factors positively influenced perceived freedom of choice. These findings on the dynamics 
of decision behaviour in a virtual environment provide further support for the view of 
voluntary decision-making as a proactive, flexible process.  
Taken together, the results of this thesis support the hypothesis that the experience 
of free choice is related to the availability of options. I propose novel links between volition 
and active inference, promoting a theory of free choice as embodied decisions that optimise 
behaviour in dynamic environments. Through a combination of neuroimaging, behavioural, 
physical, and computational measures, this thesis provides a foundation for an ecological 
and embodied approach to free choice. Below I discuss these findings within the broader 
scope of the voluntary decision-making field, with particular emphasis on the factors that 
contribute to the subjective experience of free will and their relation to behaviour that 
promotes adaptive function in the real world. 
 
Summary of thesis contributions 
Neural correlates of free decisions 
The current thesis contributes to our knowledge of the neural regions recruited during 
the proactive period of free decisions. In Chapter 2, I found that free decisions engaged 
frontoparietal and salience networks to a greater extent than instructed decisions during a 
preparatory period. The frontoparietal network has been proposed as a higher-order control 
region for free choice selection (Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012), but these studies 
reported activation only at the time of the decision, making it difficult to conclude whether 
this activity related to choice selection or action execution processes. In Chapter 2, 
activation starting at a time preceding motor planning gives credence to the argument that 
this network is involved in orchestrating free choice selection. I also found activation of the 
salience network, a network broadly recognised in evaluating the saliency of environmental 
information (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al., 2007). Both the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and insula are commonly recruited for cognitively demanding tasks, and are 
considered central in gating attention between self-related processes and external cues. 
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One possibility is that salience network activity in our task was recruited to orchestrate 
between internal choice selection and attention to external cues as they navigated the virtual 
environment, in essence reflecting the interactive nature of the decision-making process 
(Seeley, personal communication). If this is valid, I would expect this network to be more 
widely recognised in future studies as ecological approaches become more common.   
Expanding on this, in Chapter 4 I found that the availability of an alternative option 
could be decoded from two regions of the DLPFC, the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG) and 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as participants prepared to choose between two doors. Ongoing 
choice representation in this region, even when participants reported remaining with their 
initial choice, indicates that participants remained aware of possible options in the 
environment throughout the period of decision planning. This proposed link between 
attention and free choice planning is strengthened by reports that MFG activity predicts 
freely made attentional shifts (Gmeindl et al., 2016). Moreover, recruitment of the MFG has 
been reported for tasks requiring maintenance of spatial information during response 
preparation, in line with a view that participants maintained awareness of the second door 
location when it was available (Babiloni et al., 2005; Curtis et al., 2004; Ricciardi et al., 2006). 
Taking into account our findings of greater visual attention to alternative options for free than 
instructed decisions (Chapter 2), I suggest that one aspect of free choice may be the 
awareness of, and attention to, available options to choose (Lau  et al., 2004). 
One notable observation is that all the regions reported belong to key information 
processing systems in information theory-based models of cognitive control (Fan, 2014; 
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007). The ACC and DLPFC, in particular, are considered central 
hubs coordinating information flow in the brain and have been reported across a range of 
abstract decisions and modalities (Fan, 2014; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Menon & 
Uddin, 2010; Roskies, 2010). Overall, free decisions seem to demand more information 
processing and invoke greater attention to information in the internal and external 
environments than instructed decisions (Curtis & Lee, 2010; Filevich et al., 2013; Lau  et al., 
2004; Thimm et al., 2012). Hence, activity in regions such as the salience network may be 
more a reflection of these processing, or attentional, demands than any single process that 
is unique to voluntary decisions. Nonetheless, as further ecological studies are performed, 
one of the characteristics of free decisions may come to be the ongoing integration of internal 
drives with environmental inputs.  
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Proactive decision processes 
Decoding results from Chapters 2 and 3 provide detail on the progression of choice 
encoding from abstract decision to action execution. In Chapter 2, I found significant 
encoding of upcoming choices in motor and visual cortices only when participants were able 
to see and plan responses for the door they intended to select. Similarly, in Chapter 3, choice 
preparation proceeded from visual encoding into motor planning only once the available 
options were known. Particularly in the context of a dynamic environment, this indicates 
individuals may only invest in the preparation of motor plans once the availability of goal 
locations is known. Interestingly, when only one option remained, choices were translated 
directly to action plans but the availability of multiple options was associated with lower 
decoding accuracy in both studies, indicative of less stable choice representation. Previous 
studies have reported similar findings for free decisions in EEG (Fleming et al., 2009; 
Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). My fMRI findings provide further support for the theory that, 
when provided with multiple options, decisions exist in a more flexible state of decision 
preparation. 
I also provide some preliminary evidence that this flexibility of decision preparation 
translates to physical markers of decision planning. In addition to finding more visual 
fixations to alternative doors for free decisions than instructed decisions in Chapter 2, in 
Chapter 4 I found that decision trajectories were more variable when two options were 
available rather than only one. Further, a number of change-of-mind behaviours were 
exhibited, despite the fact that task stimuli provided no perceptual information and choices 
were purely driven by internally-stored information. Together, this tentatively suggests that 
decisions proceeded in a dynamic state, rather than being set from the start of the trial. 
However, changes in decision course were also more frequent in the room where one door 
was randomly locked every trial, which provides compelling evidence that participants 
already held an intention for the final goal location at the time of entering the second room. 
Forward-planning is a core aspect in sensorimotor theories of cognition (Botvinick & 
Toussaint, 2012; Cisek, 2007; Friston, 2010; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Simon & Daw, 
2011) and these results provide novel behavioural evidence to suggest individuals 
proactively prepare the actions they have available but maintain these plans in a flexible 
state until decision execution. 
 
Subjective freedom of choice 
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It has been argued that if an individual’s sense of freedom relies on having alternative 
options available, then an individual should demonstrate a preference for choice (Catania, 
1975). In Chapter 4, I directly addressed the link between free choice and availability of 
options, finding that when participants were free to navigate an environment, they were 
drawn to contexts with a greater number of options available. Accordingly, participant 
choices were predicted not only by value but also entropy, a measure of information that 
corresponds to the number of options. Most importantly, I was able to show that this free 
choice behaviour could be better explained by an active inference model than a classical 
expected utility model. This shows the potential of active inference to account for human 
decision-making behaviour, providing a model-based entity that can explain observations of 
choice preferences (Friston et al., 2015; Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). Most importantly, this 
novel link between free choice behaviour and active inference provides a formal framework 
to further investigate how embodied decisions could give rise to the sense of free will.  
An overarching aim of this thesis was to better understand the factors underlying the 
subjective experience of free will and both Chapters 3 and 4 contribute novel findings on 
this point. In a previous study on neural correlates of subjective free choice (Filevich et al., 
2013), participant responses highlighted the influence of perceived option availability. I 
explicitly examined this, finding that participants reported feeling freer in contexts where an 
alternative option was available, and associated this feeling with the intentionality of choice, 
awareness of having options available, and general feeling of their choices. Most 
importantly, I report that this individual experience of freedom can be linked to a neural 
correlate in the DLPFC that discerns option availability (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, I further 
elucidated that participants’ perceived freedom was positively influenced not only by the 
availability of options but also reward value. This is in opposition to strict libertarian views of 
free will, which consider biasing factors such as reward as constraints to freedom (Schultz, 
2015), but accords with layperson reports showing incentivised outcomes are rated as freer 
(Lau & Wenzel, 2015). Together, these findings point in favour of a view of free will not as 
purely free behaviour, but as adaptive choice behaviour (Banja, 2015). 
 
Further observations 
In addition to the examined hypotheses, two further observations were made. The 
first was that, although I aimed to minimise the contribution of choice history to the upcoming 
choice preparation, behavioural reports from Chapter 2 strongly demonstrated participants’ 
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reliance on choice patterns. I found that a significant proportion of participants concluded 
that the pseudorandomised reward stars were not, in fact, random and persisted in 
strategies they reportedly believed would maximise the number of stars gained. It has 
commonly been reported in studies with explicitly random outcomes that participants persist 
in utilising strategies in their choices and will inevitably find patterns in random data where 
there are none (Guth & Frankmann, 1965; Kostelecki et al., 2012; Lages & Jaworska, 2012; 
Tricomi et al., 2004; Yu & Cohen, 2008). In our study, the presence of rewarding outcomes 
may further have contributed to strategic behaviour as participants attempted to respond to 
perceived micro-variations in the patterns of expected value (Haggard & Eitam, 2015; Leotti 
& Delgado, 2011). While this dependence on statistical properties was historically thought 
to relate only to perceptual decisions, it appears that the statistical properties of the 
environment may also factor into voluntary decisions (Behrens et al., 2007).  
A second observation was that there was a high level of variation between individuals 
in both their decision strategies and subjective reports. This was only revealed through the 
high degree of freedom participants had to make their choices. The uniqueness of each 
individual became apparent in the first study, in which the detailed decision strategies were 
quite diverse and, in some cases, remarkably complex. In the subsequent studies (Chapters 
3 and 4), these differences were also evident in the responses of individual participants for 
perceived freedom of each of the conditions. In Chapter 3, only some participants reported 
the availability of options as being a factor driving their decisions and, while some were 
apparently content with being able to select their chosen door, others were strongly 
negatively affected by seeing the locked door. It appears that the sensitivity to having options 
is highly individual, which is further shown by the distributions of degree to which choice 
behaviour in Chapter 4 was driven by entropy gain, as well as utility gain (Fujiwara et al., 
2013; Schwartenbeck  et al., 2015). The finding in Chapter 3 that perceived freedom 
corresponded to patterns of neural activity associated with option availability raises an 
interesting consideration that these differences are not only behavioural but present at the 
neuronal level.  
 
Implications for voluntary decision-making and free will 
Embodiment of free decisions 
Free decisions have classically been considered as self-initiated decisions, arising 
from internally-generated intentions. The question has been whether neural activity can be 
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detected that is predictive of upcoming choices. There is now a strong body of literature 
showing that patterns of activity from between 200ms to 10s prior to an action encode 
information for the upcoming choice (Bode et al., 2013; Bode et al., 2011; Colas & Hsieh, 
2014; Guggisberg & Mottaz, 2013; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haynes et al., 2007; Libet, 1985; 
Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008; Soon et al., 2013). Some have interpreted these findings 
as evidence against free will, based on the premise that free will stipulates the ability of an 
individual to choose otherwise until the moment of conscious intention and that predictive 
activity violates this property (Coyne, 2012; Wegner, 2003). This seems to stem from a 
cognitivist view that neural activity leads directly to action (van Duijn & Bem, 2005). However, 
it is increasingly recognised that neither an individual’s behaviour nor the underlying brain 
states exist as discrete processes (Cisek & Pastor-Bernier, 2014; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 
2012; Spivey & Dale, 2004; van Duijn & Bem, 2005; Wang, 2008). Furthermore, it is also 
argued that the findings for highly-simplified decision contexts may not translate to more 
complex voluntary decisions, and that more wilful actions may only be understood by 
investigating “active” decisions (Batthyany, 2009; Bonn, 2013). 
 In the current thesis, I have steered towards an embodied view of cognition, 
suggesting that free decisions emerge from the interaction of an agent with their surrounding 
world (Cisek, 2007; Haggard, 2008; Schuur & Haggard, 2011; Van Dijk et al., 2008). In a 
series of three studies, I reported neural and behavioural correlates of choices during the 
proactive decision period that provide support for free decisions evolving as a dynamic 
process of choice consideration. Comparisons of predictive activity showed that choice 
representations differed between decisions that were free, or had multiple available options, 
and single-option decisions, adding to previous studies suggesting that free choices may be 
more flexibly encoded (Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). Possible 
explanations for these findings are that free choices are less strongly encoded or, 
alternatively, that discriminability is reduced due to concurrent encoding of alternative 
options (Cisek, 2007; Fleming et al., 2009). The behavioural results of greater visual 
fixations to alternatives and greater variability in the face of two options hint at the latter, 
whereby we could interpret competing evidence towards choice options to translate to 
greater physical pull towards the alternatives. This is in line with a parallel view of decision 
preparation, in which abstract decision planning and motor planning occur concurrently 
(Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012; Spivey & Dale, 2006). Together, the results of all three chapters 
show differences in both neural patterns of choice encoding and behavioural indices that 
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suggest that, when given the opportunity to choose, available options may continue to be 
factored into the decision-making process. 
 
Free will as adaptive choosing 
As you sit now, you can imagine the actions you have at your liberty to take and no 
doubt you will feel that you have multiple courses of action available to you (Searle, 2001). 
You may also have the experience of indecision, or the awareness that there are conflicting 
options to choose between (Brass et al., 2013). I have considered this awareness of having 
potential options as a central component of free will, or the subjective experience of it. 
Availability of options is a central tenet in philosophical discussions of free will (Banja, 2015), 
as well as layperson associations of free will (Monroe & Malle, 2010). The results of 
Chapters 3 and 4 show that the subjective experience of freedom can be directly 
manipulated by the availability of options. In Chapter 3, I provide a novel contribution in 
identifying neural correlates of subjective free choice and strengthen the theory that 
awareness of options fosters a sense of free will. The findings of Chapter 4 further this 
association by showing that individuals not only feel freer with choice but are drawn to 
contexts in the environment that provide more options (Bown et al., 2003; Leotti & Delgado, 
2011; Suzuki, 1997). From the subjective viewpoint, desire for free will and choice 
preference may, therefore, be highly overlapping aspects. 
What is interesting is that, in Chapter 4, participants not only associated contexts with 
more options as being freer but also reported that contexts with more reward were freer, 
despite this logically entailing that participants were more biased. This is not the first time 
that findings have been contrary to popular intuitions of free will. It was previously 
hypothesised that individuals would consider decisions that were experienced with strong 
choice deliberation freer, but Lau et al. (2015) found that participants relied more heavily on 
the ease of decision-making. Participants have also reported that decisions made in 
congruence with subliminally-primed cues were associated with higher feelings of control 
(Wenke et al., 2010). It seems that although individuals desire options to choose from, 
perceived freedom is fed by the positive experience of having made a decision without a 
sense of conflict (Lau et al., 2015; Stillman et al., 2011; Stillman et al., 2010). Rather than 
having unconditional choice, the ability to attain a desirable choice may be the most 
important factor in perceived freedom (Shepard & Reuter, 2012). Ultimately, we may not be 
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free in the philosophical sense, but relatively free within the constraints of our background 
and contexts to act in a way that we believe is optimal (Bode et al., 2014).    
This leads to the final outcome from this thesis, that free choice behaviour could be 
explained with an active inference model of cognition. In the Free Energy Principle, the 
assumption is made that individuals try to minimise the uncertainty of future states by taking 
into account not only the utility of options but the entropy of outcome states, which equates 
to the number of options agents expect (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Clark, 2013; Friston, 
2010; Friston et al., 2017; Friston et al., 2015; Pezzulo & Ognibene, 2012). The ability to link 
free choice behaviour to a model built on sensorimotor optimisation adds weight to the 
theory that free will arose as an evolutionary mechanism to encourage adaptive behaviour 
in the environment (Banja, 2015; Baumeister et al., 2011). However, while Banja (2015) 
argues that our considerations of free will should focus on our ability to make adaptive 
decisions, rather than our ability to do otherwise, I would add that our perceived ability to do 
otherwise is an essential part of our capacity to act optimally in an uncertain world. 
Ultimately, the strong regard for free will may correspond to a drive to maintain a state of 
perceived ability to modify or control the environment (Banja, 2015), which depends not only 
on attaining positive outcomes but on keeping your options open (Klyubin et al., 2005; 
Klyubin et al., 2008). 
 
Methodological considerations  
There were a number of limitations of these studies, particularly in pursuing a more 
ecologically valid experimental approach. My first challenge was to create decision contexts 
that would more closely approximate realistic decision scenarios but maintain experimental 
control. I chose virtual environments with doors in an effort to allow participants’ decisions 
to be prepared in relation to a “physical” distal goal. The choices were also incentivised by 
the use of stars and gems, although with equivalent or pseudorandomised values to 
maintain comparison to previous research. These may not be considered free from a 
philosophical lens but I have made the argument that the subjective experience of free 
choice is associated with making meaningful decisions and the inclusion of value is, 
therefore, necessary. This is corroborated by the participant reports showing that more 
valuable decisions were considered freer. On the other hand, these are far from the types 
of values and motivations that drive everyday decisions. Future studies could aim to 
incorporate more personally relevant outcomes. Further, introducing voluntary decision 
tasks into fully immersive virtual environments would allow for more veridical experiences to 
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be created, as well as having the benefit of capturing the full range of decision dynamics. 
The current research may, at least, serve as an initial step in the direction towards more 
ecological research on voluntary decision-making. 
The studies relied heavily on self-reports, inspired by the approach by Filevich et al. 
(2013) of using subjective reports to examine neural correlates of free choice. Rather than 
dictate a means by which to judge freedom, participants were left to report their perceived 
freedom according to their own associations. There is some apprehension over the use of 
self-reports due to the perceived unreliability but, especially with a topic as enigmatic as free 
will, the phenomenological experience can be considered an essential aspect to understand 
(Callard & Fitzgerald, 2014; Filevich et al., 2013). However, it is difficult to define how “free” 
one feels and, even more so to relate this to specific underlying cognitive functions. 
Descriptions on how participants judged this in Chapter 3 provided some insight, listing 
intention, choice availability, and feeling. However, as with any metacognitive measure, 
there are likely to be a variety of factors contributing to what is reported. Participants 
commonly attribute free will to positive experiences so it needs to be elucidated to what 
degree underlying factors such as ease of decision-making account for reported freedom. 
On a final note, a high degree of between-individual variation was observed in these studies. 
I have not focused on further characterising these differences but believe future research 
could benefit from understanding what gives rise to individual approaches to decision-
making. The emerging field of computation psychiatry, which aims to use formal models to 
characterise individual behaviour on a case-by-case basis is a particularly eloquent 
approach to do so (Schwartenbeck & Friston, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I aimed to investigate the neural and behavioural dynamics of voluntary 
decision-making, specifically focusing on the proactive preparation of choices. I found early 
engagement of frontoparietal and salience networks, suggestive of proactive choice 
selection, and evidence from decision trajectories suggesting that choices are planned in 
advance. These findings point to the inherently future-oriented nature of active voluntary 
decisions. However, I also found that patterns of neural activity representing free choices 
were less stably represented than instructed choices and that alternative options remained 
encoded as participants prepared to make their choices. This translated to patterns of visual 
attention and movement during preparation that indicated ongoing consideration of available 
options. Hence, possible choices may be planned in advance but held in a flexible state of 
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preparation. Subjective reports substantiated the significance of having choice, showing that 
perceived freedom was strongly influenced by option availability and could be linked to 
individual neural patterns of encoding in DLPFC. Participants also associated reward with 
feeling freer. This leads to my final contribution in tying free choice behaviour to a model of 
active inference, whereby individuals are driven to maximise both the utility and entropy of 
their choices. In conclusion, I argue that, ultimately, we are wired to optimise our future 
outcomes in an uncertain environment and the subjective experience of volition is tied to 
behaviours that are evolutionarily advantageous in such a setting. By developing an 
ecological perspective of human volition, we will gain deeper understanding into the factors 
that drive individual decisions in daily life.  
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